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Abstract
This paper deals with the concept of happiness in economics. Of
late there has come into life a branch of happiness economics and it
is this ﬁeld that will be our concern. Actually, not only economists
are interested in quantiﬁcations of happiness but also researchers
in other disciplines. Notably there are several psychologists who
investigate happiness as well. We mention Schimmack et al. (2002),
Kahneman et al. (1999, 2006), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), Clark
et al. (2008) and Lucas and Schimmack (2009). There are also some
interconnections between happiness economists and psychologists
as in the citations just mentioned. In this paper we will focus on
happiness economics, although we will sometimes refer to work in other
disciplines as well. Happiness economics is up to now an empirically
oriented ﬁeld. There is no attention for philosophical contemplations
on happiness, the sense of life, etc. as we ﬁnd in philosophy and
religious studies (see, e.g., Feldman (2010), Nussbaum and Sen (1993),
Haybron (2010) and Bok (2010) for a philosophical approach). We
shall not touch on these issues in this tract.
1
Introduction
1.1 What is Happiness?
Economic science deals with individual behavior, notably the decisions
of individuals dealing with questions like what do they buy, what do
they produce, how long do they work, how do they spend their leisure
time, whom do they choose as partner in marriage, and so on. The
basic explanation among economists and non-economists alike is that
individuals do not act haphazardly, but with a speciﬁc objective in
mind. They try to optimize or improve their situation. If a situation A
is considered to be better than situation B, we say that the individual
derives more well-being or happiness from A than from B. There are
philosophers (e.g., Haybron, 2010), who distinguish between the two
words well-being and happiness as standing for two diﬀerent concepts.
However, the problem is that at an empirical level nobody can make
out what is the exact diﬀerence between the two concepts. For instance,
it is very hard to conceive of two situations where one is happier in B
than in A, but derives more well-being from A than from B. If the
two words would stand for diﬀerent properties of A and B, then giving
‘more well being’ seems to go parallel with causing ‘more happiness’.
In short, we and most happiness economists make no semantic diﬀer-
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ences between the two. Other terms used to refer to this concept are
utility, ophelimity, eudaemonia and satisfaction. We shall take them all
as operationally synonymous. That is, we do not exclude the possibil-
ity that it is philosophically or psychologically possible to give diﬀerent
meanings to the terms, but it is empirically imposible yet with our
present day empirical instruments of observation to make a meaningful
diﬀerentiation between them.
This paper deals with the concept of happiness in economics. Of late
there has come into life a branch of happiness economics and it is
this ﬁeld that will be our concern. Actually, not only economists are
interested in quantiﬁcations of happiness but also researchers in other
disciplines. Notably there are several psychologists who investigate hap-
piness as well. We mention Schimmack et al. (2002), Kahneman et al.
(1999, 2006), Kahneman and Krueger (2006), Clark et al. (2008) and
Lucas and Schimmack (2009). There are also some interconnections
between happiness economists and psychologists as in the citations
just mentioned. In this paper, we will focus on happiness economics,
although we will sometimes refer to work in other disciplines as well.
Happiness economics is up to now an empirically oriented ﬁeld. There is
no attention for philosophical contemplations on happiness, the sense
of life, etc. as we ﬁnd in philosophy and religious studies (see, e.g.,
Feldman, 2010; Nussbaum and Sen, 1993; Haybron, 2010; Bok, 2010,
for a philosophical approach). We shall not touch on these issues in this
tract.
1.2 The Attitude of Mainstream Economics
Toward Happiness
Most economists until recently were very suspicious about happiness
economics. Actually, the common opinion in the twentieth century was
that happiness is not empirically measurable, and consequently, all
empirical studies about it could not be diﬀerent from worthless. And if
some concept is believed to be non-measurable, even theoretical studies
about happiness would not be possible as the basic ingredient was a
chimera. It is evident that we are not of that opinion, for, if so, writing
this study would make no sense. Actually there is now a growing body
4 Introduction
of serious economists who are willing, either reluctantly or wholeheart-
edly, to include happiness economics as a part of economic science.
Nevertheless, not only for describing the historical setting, but also for
a better understanding of happiness economics itself, we devote a few
pages to the viewpoint of mainstream economics, as it reigned in the
twentieth century, and as it still reigns in a shrinking majority group
of present day economists.
It is possible to describe human behavior in simple mathematical
terms. We describe situations by some dimensions we deem relevant,
say, variables X1,X2, . . .. For instance, let us take the traditional exam-
ple of consumer theory. We think of the consumption bundle of the
individual in terms of goods and services bought. A speciﬁc situation is
then described by having x1 units of bread, x2 bottles of beer, etc. The
happiness derived from a speciﬁc bundle x = (x1,x2, . . .) is set equal to
a number U(x) and behavior is described as choosing that situation
from the set of reachable situations, which maximizes U(x). Usually
it is assumed that ‘reachable’ stands for those bundles that may be
bought for an amount of money M and prices p = (p1,p2, . . .).
In the nineteenth century, economists (like Edgeworth, 1881) had
the idea that the function U(x) would be known in the near future,
leading to the situation that consumer behavior of rational utility
maximizing consumers could be rather well predicted and even cor-
rected, if it was non-optimal. The economist/sociologist Pareto (1909)
made it clear in his inﬂuential Manuel dE´conomie Politique that
things were more complicated than that. Let us assume for conve-
nience that U(x1,x2) = x21 + x
2
2 which is maximized under the budget
constraint x1 + 2x2 = 10,x1,x2 > 0. This yields an optimal consump-
tion bundle or demand vector. However, we see that maximization of
U˜(x1,x2) =
√
x21 + x
2
2 would yield the same optimum. Actually, each
U˜(x1,x2) = φ(U(x1,x2)) where φ(U(·)) is a monotonously increasing
function will yield the same optimum. Hence, observing choice behav-
ior does not give suﬃcient information to detect the utility function in
the background that is maximized. Or said more precisely, there is an
inﬁnite class of utility functions, which yield the same choice behavior.
It is therefore that we speak of an ordinal utility concept. What do the
ordinal utility functions belonging to one class have in common? These
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are the so-called utility indiﬀerence curves, where an indiﬀerence curve
is the whole set of points given by the equation U(x1,x2) = u, where u is
a constant. They can be discovered by observing the demand behavior
when the budget constraint is varying, say, by varying income M and
the price vector p in the variable budget p1x1 + p2x2 = M . Hence, the
fact is that the common indiﬀerence curves can in theory be detected or
identiﬁed by looking at choice behavior, even if in reality this method
is rather diﬃcult to apply as there is not much price variation in most
consumer surveys. However, by this method we are unable to detect
the speciﬁc utility function used by the individual, because there is
a multitude of so-called cardinal utility functions yielding the same
empirical choice behavior. There is no one–one relationship between
the observed choice behavior and the underlying utility function yield-
ing the observed behavior.
This fact, ﬁrst explicitly signaled by Pareto, changed the progress
of economic science in the twentieth century. The inﬂuential tract An
Essay on the Nature and Signiﬁcance of Economic Science by Robbins
(1932, 1938) gave a ﬁnal blow to the idea of cardinal utility. Debreu
(1959), Houthakker (1950) and Samuelson (1947, 1974) established a
new structure of economic science in which the utility concept (cardinal
but even ordinal) was factually eliminated. One of the main instruments
of which one had great expectations, the utility function, lost much of
its position, as it could not be empirically identiﬁed for individuals.
This is not to say, of course, that individuals do not have some cardinal
utility function in mind when performing choices between alternatives,
but it cannot be estimated from their choice behavior.
Since Pareto’s work, the measurement of utility fell into disgrace.
Not only was observation of demand behavior shown to be insuf-
ﬁcient to derive the individual’s cardinal utility/happiness function,
but knowledge of cardinal utility appeared also unnecessary to make
welfare judgments or to predict behavior. A utility function became
just a description of a preference ordering or rather of a net of indif-
ference curves, losing all its classical meaning of describing levels of
pleasure. Therefore, looking for an alternative source of measurement
became unnecessary. Since Pareto and especially since the publication
of Lionel Robbins’ inﬂuential tract in 1932 most mainstream economists
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were mainly preoccupied on minimizing the necessary assumptions to
describe human behavior and welfare economics was left with income
as the only measure to compare well-being between individuals.
In the previous lines we chose consumer behavior as our playground,
but the same holds for all situations of choice, e.g., when choosing
between jobs, or between marriage partners.
Nevertheless, this strong result on the non-measurability of utility
or happiness is also very unsatisfactory. In common language, people
speak about ‘John being very happy lately’, and happiness is compared
between individuals, e.g., ‘John is much happier than Peter’. This sug-
gests that individuals are able to measure the level of happiness of
people, including their own happiness, and that individuals are able to
make interpersonal comparisons of happiness. Obviously, the exactness
of such measurements has to be taken with a grain of salt and the
measurement outcomes will ﬂuctuate over time and circumstances, but
there is no reason why everyday statements by almost every individual
would have no basis at all. The point is also clearly visible when we
think on the deﬁnition of poverty. If poverty is a status of low well-being
and we pretend that we can recognize individuals as being ‘poor’, then
it implies that some kind of measurement of well-being is possible. For
instance, if the poverty line for a family of four persons is set by Parlia-
ment at 1200 per month, it suggests strongly that the well-being that
may be derived from an amount below 1200 per month is considered
too low in the speciﬁc country.
Could it be that cardinal well-being after all is measurable, but that
the instrument which economics used thus far, observation of choice
behavior, is not the right instrument of observation? Despite the log-
ical positivism that has dominated economics since the 1930s, some
economists walked against the stream and did look for alternatives to
the measurement of utility by asking individuals themselves about the
satisfaction level they are experiencing or which happiness values they
would assign to hypothetical situations. The simplest question of this
type is given in Figure 1.1
This is what we may call the direct approach to happiness
measurement. Although intuitively this seems an obvious way to get
information, there are social scientists that doubt the validity of such a
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How satisfied are youwith your life as a whole?
Please answer according to scale below
0______1______2______3______4______5______6______7______8______9______10 
completely  completely
dissatisfied satisfied
Fig. 1.1 Life satisfaction question.
question. However, at the moment question modules of this type have
been posed to millions of individuals all over the globe, and it is seen
that the great majority of respondents has no problem whatsoever to
answer on this question and it has also been seen that most people
in the same objective circumstances evaluate their life approximately
by the same ﬁgure. This question is the prototype of the happiness
questions, which form the basic instrument for all studies in happiness
economics.
The same question can be posed to individuals with respect to spe-
ciﬁc aspects/domains of their life, e.g., their ﬁnancial situation, their
health, their marriage life, the satisfaction with their job, etc. Then we
speak of domain satisfactions.
There are basically two ways to study data sets in general and hap-
piness in particular. The ﬁrst is so-called primary analysis. This is just a
matter of tabulating and counting to get answers on the question what
fraction of the population under consideration is happy and what frac-
tion is unhappy, mostly diﬀerentiated with respect to relevant subsets,
e.g., age brackets, income brackets, or education segments. So-called
secondary analysis goes further. It tries to ﬁnd out why individuals
feel happy or less happy, it is a quest for the determining factors that
cause happiness, or as econometricians say, the explanatory variables.
In this paper we shall focus in line with the economic literature on the
secondary analysis.
The direct approach to happiness measures relies on the assump-
tion that self-reported satisfaction can be used as a proxy measure
for utility. For economists, the most obvious way to test this assump-
tion is to examine whether individual behavior can be explained or
predicted by the individual’s reported happiness. Up to this time and
to our knowledge, there are only a very few studies that have tried
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to do this. We mention Kapteyn et al. (1979) that tried to do just
that on the basis of the direct approach to utility measurement. Their
outcome was that in the context of consumer behavior the assumption
that consumers maximized their utility had to be ﬁrmly rejected. Actu-
ally, they came out with much more support for so-called ‘satisﬁcing’
behavior. This term, coined by Simon (1955), stands for behavior that
tries to maintain the status quo, except if satisfaction falls behind a
critical level, in which case the individual tries to ﬁnd a better posi-
tion. According to Wikipedia ‘satisﬁcing is a decision-making strategy
that attempts to meet criteria for adequacy, rather than to identify an
optimal solution. A satisﬁcing strategy may often be (near) optimal
if the costs of the decision-making process itself, such as the cost of
obtaining complete information, are considered in the outcome calcu-
lus (see also Schwartz et al., 2002; Frijters, 2000). Clark (2001) shows
that reported job satisfaction can predict future job quits while control-
ling for a set of job characteristics; Guven et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the
satisfaction gap between spouses explains the probability of a future
divorce; Oswald et al. (2009) ﬁnd a positive causal correlation between
happiness reports and individuals’ productivity in a laboratory setting;
and Helliwell (2007) ﬁnds a negative correlation between the probabil-
ity to committ suicide and self-reported life satisfaction. From a some-
what diﬀerent perspective, Oswald and Wu (2011) correlate subjective
measures of happiness with a market-derived indicator of quality of life
(i.e., behavior observed in the market). They ﬁnd a very strong corre-
lation between reported happiness of one million US individuals and
an objective measure of regional quality of life.
Other scientists have sustained the meaningfulness of satisfaction
measures by reporting positive correlations between reported happi-
ness and physical expressions such as amount of smiling in the ques-
tionnaire (Sandvik et al., 1993), changes in facial muscles (Kahneman,
1999), and physical measures of brain activity (Urry et al., 2004); or
by proving that individuals can predict each others’ reported happiness
levels (Diener and Lucas, 1999; Sandvik et al., 1993).
In Section 2 we start by considering the methods of analysis in
happiness economics. In Section 3 we consider life satisfaction (or hap-
piness), in Section 4 we consider domain satisfactions, in Section 5 we
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return to the ordinality–cardinality question, and in Section 6 we lay
the link between domain satisfactions and satisfaction with life as a
whole. In Section 7 we consider the work of the Leyden school that
may be seen as a forerunner of modern happiness economics. In Sec-
tion 8 we consider the eﬀect of the individual’s reference group on her
his happiness. In Section 9 we consider what we can say about the
inﬂuence of past events and the anticipated future on present life sat-
isfaction. In Section 10 we deal with the eﬀect of climate and more
generally of the external environment on satisfaction. In Section 11 we
consider the eﬀect of inequality on individual happiness and we con-
sider happiness inequality per se. In Section 12 we consider in how far
the vignette approach, so popular in marketing, can be applied in hap-
piness economics. In Section 13 we try to delineate the signiﬁcance of
happiness economics for normative economics. In Section 14 we draw
some conclusions and discuss the relevance of the new ﬁndings for eco-
nomic science and the social sciences in general.
There is nowadays an enormous production of papers in happiness
economics, and the reader will understand that it is unfeasible to do
justice to all contributions. Moreover, the task of reading would become
rather tedious for the reader of this tract who wants a short introduc-
tion into the ﬁeld. We mention here a few recent monographs that give
introductions to the ﬁeld. Not only are they sometimes more detailed
than ours, but they have rather diﬀerent outlooks and accents as well.
We mention a.o. Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005), Frey (2008),
Graham (2009), Bok (2010), Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004,
2008).
2
Happiness: Methods of Analysis
2.1 Question Modes
As already said the question module in Figure 1.1 (“How satisﬁed are
you with your life as a whole?”) will be interpreted by most respondents
as asking ‘how happy are you?’ The somewhat less emotional detached
wording ‘satisﬁed’ instead of ‘happy’ is chosen as some respondents may
have diﬀerent emotional interpretations of the word ‘happy’. Obviously,
the 0–10-scale is not sacrosanct. There are versions with a 1–7-scale or
even a 1–3-scale. Clearly, the coarser the scale, the less information will
be conveyed by the respondent. However, a too ﬁne scale may lead to
a confusing seemingly exactness, because respondents are not able to
respond to this type of questions with too much accuracy. It is well-
known that respondents are subject to moods that vary over the day.
Hence, there is a natural variation in the response, when the question
is asked repeatedly to the same person. What we are aiming for is
the general average and this is the way in which the responses are
interpreted. If one likes to get an idea of these variations depending on
mood, you might add to the above question ‘satisﬁed at this moment
or the last half hour’. The psychologists Kahneman et al. (2004) have
developed a method called the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM)
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by means of which they collect data per period of 20 minutes that
reconstructs the daily experiences of the respondents during the day.
This method can be seen as an alternative to the well-being questions
and has also been used by other researchers (White and Dolan, 2009).
For cost reasons and the selectivity introduced because many people
will not be willing to make this eﬀort, there are only a very few surveys
using this method.
Actually, the idea of using numerical answers was not the popular
version 10 years ago. In older versions, still in usage, the response cate-
gories are cast in verbal terms, like “Very happy”, “Happy”, “Not very
Happy”, “Not happy at all”, or “Fully satisﬁed”, “Rather satisﬁed”,
“Both yes and no”, “Less than satisﬁed”, “Not at all satisﬁed”. The
reason was that survey designers were afraid that respondents would
be unable to answer on a numerical scale. This fear may be dispelled
by now. The general feeling among researchers is that the outcomes of
these numerical questions are generally comparable.
Finally, we mention that in the future it is very probable that dis-
crete response categories will become old-fashioned as well. If we ask a
person to answer by crossing a point on a line segment, where the left
endpoint stands for ‘completely unhappy’ and the right endpoint for
‘completely happy’, we have in fact a continuous response scale. This
mode has been used experimentally in Van Praag (1991). Nowadays, it
would not be diﬃcult to implement this continuous response scale in a
computerized survey setting.
2.2 Methods of Secondary Analysis
Before we look at speciﬁc empirical results we have to devote some lines
on the diﬀerent estimation methods in use. The secondary analysis
of happiness data is hampered by the fact that responses are nearly
always categorical or discrete. Moreover, there is an ongoing debate
on the interpretation of those data. Do they have cardinal signiﬁcance
or only ordinal signiﬁcance? Apart from the two now frequently used
methods we look after some alternative methods, recently introduced
by Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) but already used by a.o.
Luechinger (2009), Stevenson and Wolfers (2008c) and Pischke (2010).
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Whatever the speciﬁc categorization let us call the response by indi-
vidual n Un, where Un can assume, for instance, the values 0, . . . ,10 or
1, . . . ,7. If the response scale is verbal, it is still ordered from ‘worst’ to
‘best’ and the response categories may be translated into numbers. On
the other hand we have a number of characteristics of the individual n,
say x1n,x2n, . . . ,xmn of which we suspect that they might co-determine
happiness. We may think of age, health status, family, income, job, etc.
The two most frequently used approaches are Ordinary Least
Squares and Ordered Probit. OLS is obviously the easiest method and
also intuitively most appealing. We assume a model equation
Un = β1x1n + · · · + βmxmn + β0 + εn (2.1)
The individual response by n is inﬂuenced by a number of personal
variables x1n,x2n, . . . ,xmn. The eﬀects β reﬂect the size of the inﬂuence.
If the eﬀect is positive, it is happiness-increasing, if it is zero, there is no
eﬀect, and if it is negative, increasing the corresponding variable will
reduce happiness. The trade-oﬀ between two dimensions is given by
the equation β1∆x1 + β2∆x2 = 0. For instance, if x1 stands for income
and x2 for health status, then a deterioration in health by ∆x2 may be
neutralized by an income increase of ∆x1 = (β2/β1)∆x2. We call the
ratio (β2/β1) the trade-oﬀ-ratio between income and health.
Actually, Equation (2.1) describes a satisfaction-indiﬀerence-hyper-
plane in the space Rm. Figure 2.1 shows a set of linear indiﬀerence
curves in the income-health space. Each point (x1n,x2n, . . . ,xmn) stands
for the description of the situation of a speciﬁc individual n. The planes
are parallel where each level of happiness U = 0,1,2, . . . ,10 corresponds
with a speciﬁc plane. Geometrically, the trade-oﬀ coeﬃcients describe
the slope coeﬃcients of the plane.
The estimates β are found by minimizing the sum of squared
residuals
S2 =
N∑
n=1
(Un − β1x1n + · · · + βmxmn + β0)2
The OP-approach is diﬀerent. We may divide the sample or popula-
tion in respondent subsets of ‘most unhappy’, ‘rather unhappy’, etc.
according to the response categories, say U = 0,1,2, . . . ,10. The cor-
responding response fractions are p0,p1, . . . ,p10. For example 1% of
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Fig. 2.1 Indiﬀerence curves, health-income.
the respondents is completely unhappy, that is p0 = 0.01, 3% ranks
itself in the category 1, so p1 = 0.03, and so on. The fractions evi-
dently add up to 100%. Similarly we deﬁne the cumulative fractions
P0 = 0.01,P1 = p0 + p1 = 0.01 + 0.03 and so on. It implies that, e.g.,
P6 is the fraction of the sample that is happy at level 6 or less. By
construction the Pi’s increase with happiness level i.
Now it is intuitively obvious that the chance on being happy or not
depends on personal dimensions xn. Hence, we may parameterize the
P ’s as
Pi(x) = F (µi;x,β), i = 1, . . . , I (2.2)
where F (·) is a probability distribution and where µi is increasing in i.
More speciﬁcally, it is frequently assumed that F (·) is a normal dis-
tribution function with expectation parameter β1x1 + · · · + βmxm and
variance equal to 1.
We have
Pi(x) = N(µi − β′x;0,1) (2.3)
We notice that Pi(x) itself can be seen as a happiness indicator. Let us
now deﬁne the latent variable
u = β1x1 + · · · + βmxm + ε (2.4)
where the ﬁrst term β′x is non-random and where ε is a random error
term with standard normal distribution. Then we have
Pi(x) = P{u ≤ µi}
= N(µi − β′x;0,1)
(2.5)
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The similarity between Equations (2.1) and (2.4) is of course striking.
Indeed u is also a happiness indicator. It is a monotonic transform of
P where P assumes values on [0,1] and u on (−∞,+∞). In both cases
(2.1) and (2.4) the index may be decomposed into a non-random, i.e.,
structural part β′x and a random part ε.
In this case the eﬀects β are estimated by maximizing the log-
likelihood of the sample, that is
L =
N∑
n=1
ln(N(µin − β′xn) − N(µin−1 − β′xn)) (2.6)
with respect to β and µ. Here in is the response category to which
respondent n belongs, µ0 = −∞,µI = +∞, and there are I response
categories in total.
Notice that in this case β′x = u again describes the parallel indiﬀer-
ence curves. If the two approaches are applied on the same responses
to the same life satisfaction question it is logical that both estima-
tion methods should produce the same net of indiﬀerence curves,
that is, the same trade-oﬀ ratios, apart from statistical deviations.
It follows then that βOP = γ × βOLS, for some multiplying factor γ,
where βOP,βOLS stand for the corresponding OP- and OLS-estimates.
The same is expected to hold for all other methods that estimate
the trade-oﬀ ratios. This seems to be true indeed (see, e.g., Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters, 2004, Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004,
2008, Section 2).
Health
Income
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Fig. 2.2 Indiﬀerence curves, health-income.
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It follows that we do not have to be very anxious on which particular
estimation method is used. If we want to estimate trade-oﬀ ratios, in
nearly all cases all methods will yield approximately the same results
except for a multiplication factor.
We notice that the linearity of the model is not so linear as we think.
For instance, we may introduce next to a variable like age another
variable (age)2. In this way we may add non-linear features to the
model. In Figure 2.2, we see a net of indiﬀerence curves after a non-
linear transformation of the variables Health and income.
3
Life Satisfaction, Happiness
As said before, the literature abounds nowadays of happiness stud-
ies. More or less as an example we reproduce and comment on rather
recent results, borrowed from Carol Graham (2009). Her results are not
unique in the sense that many others have estimated similar equations,
but they are interesting because her results demonstrate the general
validity of the happiness approach. She estimated the same equation
for the U.S., Latin-America and Russia (see Graham, pp. 52–54). We
reproduce her results in Table 3.1.
The results are so attractive because they show that although there
are diﬀerences between the three continents there is also a striking
similarity. We notice that the variables are slightly diﬀerently deﬁned
for the three samples used by Graham. These diﬀerences were dictated
by the fact that these were existing surveys for diﬀerent objectives with
a diﬀerent setup. For a detailed description of the diﬀerences we refer
to Graham (2009).
The ﬁrst point to be noticed is the age eﬀect. Nearly always the
age eﬀect is parabolic. When young people grow older their happiness
reduces, until a minimum is reached between 40 and 50, and after that
age happiness increases again. This age eﬀect is found by many other
16
17
Table 3.1. Life satisfaction equations estimated for three continents.
Happiness in USA, Happiness in Latin-America, Happiness in Russia,
1972–1998 2001 2000
Age −0.025∗∗ Age −0.025∗∗ Age −0.067∗∗
Age2 0.038∗∗ Age2 0.000∗∗ Age2 0.001∗∗
Male −0.199∗∗ Male −0.002 Male 0.152∗∗
Married 0.775∗∗ Married 0.056∗ Married 0.088
Log(income) 0.163∗∗ Log(wealth
Index)
0.395∗∗ log(equiv.
Income)
0.389∗∗
Education 0.007 Yrs of education −0.003 Level
education
0.015
Black −0.400∗∗ Minority −0.083∗∗ Minority 0.172∗∗
Other than black 0.049
Student 0.291∗∗ Student 0.066 Student 0.199∗
Retired 0.291∗∗ Retired −0.005 Retired −0.378∗∗
Housekeeper 0.065∗ Homemaker −0.053 Housewife 0.049
Unemployed −0.684∗∗ Unemployed −0.485∗∗ Unemployed −0.657∗∗
Self-employed 0.098∗∗ Self-employed −0.098∗∗ Self-
employed
0.537∗∗
Health 0.623∗∗ Self-report health 0.468∗∗ Health index 0.446∗∗
Pseudo R2 0.075 Pseudo R2 0.062 Pseudo R2 0.033
Number of obs. 24128 Number of obs. 15209 Number of
obs.
5134
Note: ∗∗signiﬁcance of 95%, ∗signiﬁcance at 90%.
Source: Graham (2009) Happiness around the World (pp. 52–54), Oxford University
Press.
authors, where Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2007) were the ﬁrst to estab-
lish this as a worldwide trend by comparing many countries. Males
are happier than women in Russia, but less happy than women in the
U.S. In Latin America the gender eﬀect is virtually zero. The eﬀect of
income is always positive, but the size of the income eﬀect diﬀers quite
considerably between the USA and Russia, being in Russia much larger
than in the U.S. In Latin-America it proved to be diﬃcult to measure
household income accurately, as much of the income is ‘informal’ or in
kind. Therefore researchers measured for Latin-America a correlate of
income, a speciﬁc wealth index, based on an assessment by the inter-
viewer of the household economic status and a long list of questions
about ownership of goods and assets. The retired status in the USA
is correlated with more happiness, while the retired in Russia are less
happy than the workers. The unemployed status has a negative eﬀect
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in each of the three continents. The most important eﬀect appears to
stem from the health variable.
The evidence seems overwhelming that the responses on happiness
questions by individuals are not haphazard but that they really reﬂect
the happiness level of the individuals. This may be derived from the
fact that the eﬀects just estimated make intuitively sense and from the
fact that most of the eﬀects are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In
short, we can ﬁnd a deﬁnite underlying structure.
However, what we also see is that the structures between diﬀerent
cultures/countries may be similar in one sense and diﬀerent in another
sense. They are similar because in the three examples the same individ-
ual characteristics seem to aﬀect individual happiness, but they are also
diﬀerent, as the numerical values of the estimated eﬀects are widely dif-
ferent. Even sometimes the signs are diﬀerent (cf. retirement). Clearly,
these diﬀerences reﬂect the fact that there are diﬀerent social structures
in the various countries. For instance, the status of retirement of the
Russian retiree is no cause for envy, while the American retiree is fre-
quently in a comfortable position. The same may hold for the status of
the self-employed. In Russia mostly successful (0.537), in Latin-America
(−0.098) not.
A second question point is the causality. Can we assume that indi-
viduals are happier because they have more income, or is it the other
way round: happy individuals are mostly socially more adapted and
therefore they get the better jobs and hence more income. It is very
hard to ﬁnd out the direction of the causality up to any degree of
certainty. The same holds for the variable health. Are people feeling
happier if they are healthier, or is a happy person feeling more healthy
than an unhappy person? The same holds for the variables family size,
marriage, etc. Most of the recent literature uses ﬁxed eﬀects estimators
in order to account for individual personality traits, which means that
the estimations are based on within-individual variations. Although this
corrects for part of the causality problem to the extent that the indi-
vidual’s own personality determines both happiness and behavior, it
does not solve the problem completely (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters,
2004). Stutzer and Frey (2006), for example, use a ﬁxed eﬀects estima-
tor and ﬁnd that happier individuals are more likely to get married,
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which presents no evidence that marriage makes people happier, but
rahter that happier people have a larger chance to marry. In order to
tackle the causality issues deeply one would need natural experiments
or reliable instruments. Although dealing with the causality problem
is gaining importance in the literature, this issue is yet far from being
solved.
The causal relationship between income and happiness has been
studied from various perspectives. Using lottery winnings, Gardner and
Oswald (2007) and Kuhn et al. (2011) examine the causal eﬀect of
income on happiness. Since winning a lottery is not depending on the
individual’s characteristics (except that he is buying a lot), the causal-
ity problem is absent. If somebody is happier after winning the lot-
tery, the direction of causality can only be from extra money to extra
happiness. While the ﬁrst authors ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of wining the
lottery on happiness, the last ones found no eﬀect of the lottery prize
on reported happiness six months after wining. An important weak-
ness of these studies is that it is uncertain whether the result says
much about the causality between happiness and income in general.
Using the German reuniﬁcation as a natural experiment, Frijters et al.
(2004) exploit the income increase in East German after the fall of the
wall and conclude that income does have a positive causal eﬀect on
reported happiness. Pischke (2010) and Powdthavee (2010) use instead
an instrumental variable approach. Pischke (2010) uses industry wage
diﬀerentials as instruments for income and Powdthavee (2010) uses the
proportion of household members with payslip information. The two
authors ﬁnd that income plays an important role on determining hap-
piness, i.e., there is a positive causal eﬀect of income on happiness.
The causality issue may, as the papers mentioned suggest, strongly
aﬀect the estimated coeﬃcients and hence the estimated indiﬀerence
curves.
4
Domain Satisfactions
As said before there are several dimensions of life, like health, ﬁnan-
cial situation, social relations, family, housing, etc.; they are called life
domains and just as we may ask for satisfaction with life as a whole
we may ask individuals how satisﬁed they are with speciﬁc domains
of life. Such questions can be analyzed in the same way as life satis-
faction. When specifying on speciﬁc domains, it is obvious that such
questions are easier to respond to. Asking for life satisfaction involves
that respondents go into a thought process as: how satisﬁed I am with
my marriage: very good and with my health: bad, and so on for other
domains. After that we have to weigh oﬀ the diﬀerent domains against
each other in order to come to an overall evaluation. If we accept this
thought model, it is understandable, why it is for most people much
easier to evaluate a single aspect of life than life as a whole. The latter
evaluation involves weighing diﬀerent aspects against each other, while
evaluating a speciﬁc domain is a much more monolithic activity. The
result of domain satisfaction is also much less ambiguous than when
we are evaluating life as a whole. Finally, the eﬀect of variables on a
domain satisfaction is in most cases rather straightforward. Consider
for instance the eﬀect of age. Older people will have more income than
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younger people, but their health will be less. It follows that their ﬁnan-
cial satisfaction will increase, due to their higher income. At the same
time being older they are probably less healthy. Hence the eﬀect of age
is positive for ﬁnancial satisfaction and negative for health satisfaction.
If life satisfaction may be seen as the aggregate, it is unclear whether
the age eﬀect on life satisfaction will be positive or negative. This makes
it advisable to look at domain satisfactions in their own right. Here we
have a host of various domains, each with its own speciﬁc literature.
We do not aim at completeness, but we will try to give a few illustrative
examples.
4.1 Job Satisfaction
It is generally supposed that there is a link between how well workers
function in their job and how satisﬁed they are with their work. This
makes the concept of job satisfaction rather relevant for employers.
Social scientists of diﬀerent brands are and have been interested for a
long time in the measurement of job satisfaction. We think primarily of
psychologists, human resources managers, and labor economists. One
of the ﬁrst labor economists who studied the concept was Freeman
(1978). The main question that is tapped for information is : “All in
all how satisﬁed would you say you are with your job?”: not at all/not
too satisﬁed/somewhat satisﬁed/very satisﬁed. It is obvious that this
question may be analyzed in a similar way as life satisfaction.
Here we shall consider, as an example, the estimated job satisfac-
tion equation from Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008a,b),
Section 3. They look for determinants of job satisfaction by proposing
a model equation of the type
unt =β1x1,nt + · · · + βmxm,nt + γ1x1,n. + · · · + γmxm,n. + εn. + εnt
(4.1)
Here unt stands for a satisfaction index, more precisely of individual
n in year t,xk,nt stands for the value of the explanatory variable Xk
of individual n in year t,xk,n. stands for the average value of the
explanatory variable Xk of individual n over the period 1996–2001,
the error variables εn. for a random ﬁxed eﬀect and εnt for white noise,
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respectively. This is the so-called Mundlak (1978) speciﬁcation. We esti-
mated the Equation (4.1) by means of the Probit OLS-method, which
was ﬁrst proposed and applied in Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell
(2004, 2008a,b). Here unt is not cardinalized by the values 0,1, . . . ,10
as in the OLS-cardinalization but by so-called POLS-values.
The POLS-method attempts to do the same as the Ordered Probit-
method, based on a slightly simpliﬁed model. The philosophy behind
the POLS-method is the following. Let us assume again that Pi(x) =
N(µi − β′x;0,1) − N(µi−1 − β′x;0,1), but that all β’s are zero. Let
the sample response fractions be p0,p1, . . . ,p10, then the correspond-
ing normal quantiles µi are deﬁned by N(µ0) = 0,N(µ1) = p0,N(µ2) =
p0 + p1, . . . ,N(µ11) = 1, where N(·) stands for the normal distribution
function. The corresponding best guesses for ui without further infor-
mation on the x-values are then the conditional expectations
ui = E(u|µi−1 < u ≤ µi) = n(µi−1) − n(µi)
N(µi) − N(µi−1)
The last equality is well-known from normal distribution theory (see,
e.g., Maddala, 1983).
The POLS-method is now that the ‘observations’ uin are regressed
on the explanatory variables xn. As is demonstrated in Van Praag
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008a,b) the trade-oﬀ ratios derived by
the POLS-method are nearly identical to the trade-oﬀ ratios derived
by OLS or Ordered Probit estimation. The advantage of this method
compared to OP is, that, when estimating panel data, the random ﬁxed
eﬀect error structure is much easier implemented than with a similar
model in the OP-framework. Comparing the OLS-cardinalization with
the POLS-cardinalization, the latter is more ﬂexible as it depends on
the response distribution via the p’s.
In Table 4.1 we reproduce here job satisfaction estimates for the UK
(1996–1998), tapped from the British household Panel Survey (BHPS)
(see also Freeman (1978), Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2010) for similar
results).
Table 4.1 is an example of the equations that are estimated in the
job satisfaction literature. We see that those estimates take into account
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Table 4.1. Job satisfaction UK, 1996–1998, POLS individual random eﬀects.
Estimate t-Ratio
Constant 11.070 9.330
Dummy for 1996 −0.009 −0.574
Dummy for 1997 0.017 1.142
Ln(age) −7.323 −11.297
(Ln (age))2 1.162 12.556
Minimum age 23
Gender (male) −0.465 −4.159
Ln(household income) 0.029 1.078
Ln(years education) 0.008 0.068
Ln(adults) −0.089 −1.750
Ln(children +1) −0.003 −0.048
Living together 0.128 5.048
Ln(work income) 0.416 4.768
Ln(work income)∗ Ln(age) −0.109 −4.989
Ln(work income)∗ Ln(yrs education) −0.014 −0.788
Ln(work income)∗ male 0.053 3.266
Self-employed 0.143 1.996
Ln(work hours) −0.031 −1.900
Ln(extra hours) 0.029 3.437
Work at night −0.119 −1.961
Ln(hours household work) −0.004 −0.396
Mean (ln(household income)) −0.041 −1.140
Mean (ln(work income)) 0.006 0.434
Mean (ln(children +1)) 0.133 2.314
Mean (ln(adults)) 0.075 1.212
Std. dev. of indiv.random eﬀect εn 0.766
% variance due to εn 0.778
Number of observations 17,575
Number of individuals 7619
R2:
Within 0.003
Between 0.047
Overall 0.038
Note: There are dummies for missing variables, which are not included in the
table. Although this method of dealing with missing variables is fairly standard,
it should be noted that the method may bias some estimates. We refer to Jones
(1996). A probably better method is ‘pairwise deletion’, but here we have still
the diﬃculty that missing may be non-random but auto-selective.
Source: Table 3.12 in Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008a,b).
frequently 10 or more explanatory variables, where most of them appear
to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
The many results in the literature demonstrate that the same
equation explains the data fairly well and that mostly at least the signs
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are the same. For instance, males are in most countries less satisﬁed
with their job than females under ceteris paribus conditions. The eﬀect
of age is parabolic in all countries. Satisfaction declines with age when
people are young, reaching a minimum at about somewhere between
20 and 45, depending on the country, and increasing after that age.
This parabolic age eﬀect seems to be an empirical law, not only for job
satisfaction, but also for nearly all other domain satisfactions as well
except for health satisfaction (see Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
2004, 2008a,b). We will meet it again. Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2007)
discovered the same age eﬀect for life satisfaction, while Plug and Van
Praag (1995) found the age-eﬀect for ﬁnancial satisfaction.
We distinguish between household income and work income. The
household income is seen as a source of maintenance of the family,
while work income is the income of the individual respondent, gener-
ated by his job. The latter income is a symbol of how the respondent’s
work is appreciated by his/her employer. Hence, it is not strange that
household income is non-signiﬁcant when explaining job satisfaction.
Singles are less satisﬁed than people living together. As expected, work
income is an important determinant, as it expresses ‘the value’ of the
individual in his working environment. However, we see from the inter-
action with age that the eﬀect of working income diminishes with rising
age. Males are more sensitive with respect to their work income than
females. Self-employed are more satisﬁed with their job than employ-
ees. The number of working hours has a negative eﬀect, while work in
overtime has a positive eﬀect on job satisfaction. This may be explained
again by the fact that the worker feels that his work is so important that
overtime is needed. On the other hand work at night is for understand-
able reasons negatively evaluated. Somewhat unexpectedly, the number
of children increases job satisfaction. In this equation we added some
‘mean terms’. This is the average over all the periods observed. We get
a better understanding if we write
0.416 ∗ ln(workincome) + 0.006 ∗ meanworkincome
= 0.416 ∗ [ln(workincome) − ln(meanworkincome)]
+0.422 ∗ meanworkincome
The ﬁrst term is the log-diﬀerence between actual wage and average
wage during the period. We see then that for the UK job satisfaction
4.2 Financial Satisfaction 25
is strongly aﬀected both by momentary changes in pay and by the
long-period average wage.
As we already said, Table 4.1 is just one example of the many studies
on job satisfaction. However, some general points can be inferred from
this. Job satisfaction can be empirically measured and explained, while
the results are meaningful. By looking at the results it becomes possible
to estimate the separate eﬀects of job conditions, which could not be
separately isolated until now by other methods. As such these results
are valuable for handling human resources in ﬁrms, in industries and
the public sector, and ﬁnally for government policy.
However, satisfaction as such remains an esoteric matter. Fortu-
nately, it is mostly possible to make a translation into money terms.
Consider for instance the eﬀect of various kinds of labor contracts in
the UK. Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2010) estimate the eﬀect of diﬀer-
ences in labor contracts on job satisfaction by including dummy vari-
ables for the various contract types. From their Table 4.2 we see that
if somebody in the U.K. switches from a ﬁxed (temporary) contract
to a permanent contract, his satisfaction according to their estimates
would increase by 0.113. We may assign a monetary value to the
switch, by looking for the income reduction that would neutralize
the increase in job satisfaction. If his satisfaction should not increase,
this can be done by reducing his log(meanwage) by ∆ log(meanwage).
Using the coeﬃcient for log(meanwage) this would imply solving the
equation 0.129∆ log(meanwage)= 0.113 for ∆ log(meanwage), which
would suggest that meanwage would have to be decreased by a fac-
tor exp(−0.113/0.129) = 42%. Clearly, this result has to be taken with
a grain of salt. First, the calculation is based on statistical estimates
which in themselves contain a considerable inaccuracy. Second the func-
tional speciﬁcation is nice and tractable, but does it really reﬂect the
indiﬀerence surface in enough detail to draw such far-reaching conclu-
sions? Nevertheless, it demonstrates that in principle the results may be
useful to translate non-monetary labor conditions into terms of money.
4.2 Financial Satisfaction
A second domain of life is one’s ﬁnancial situation. Obviously, infor-
mation on this is retrieved by putting the question: ‘How satisﬁed are
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you with your ﬁnancial situation?’ There are, a bit surprisingly, not too
many studies on this issue. It seems according to Delaney et al. (2008)
that the estimates by Van Praag et al. (2003) were the ﬁrst. However,
in this tract we shall consider the work by Delaney et al. (2008), which
provides a very interesting example of an investigation of ﬁnancial sat-
isfaction. Moreover, it gives the possibility to introduce the reference
mechanism. We reproduce their result in Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
Delaney et al. (2008) consider an Irish panel data set which ran
over the period 1994–2001. We quote: ‘The Living in Ireland Survey
forms the Irish component of the European Community Household
Panel (ECHP): an EU-wide project, co-ordinated by Eurostat, to con-
duct harmonized longitudinal surveys dealing with the social situation,
ﬁnancial circumstances and living standards of European individuals
and households. The ﬁrst wave of the ECHP was conducted in 1994,
and the same individuals and households were followed each year. The
survey ran for eight waves, until 2001’.
In their study of ﬁnancial satisfaction they incorporate several
elements we did not consider up to now. We shall not dwell on
the econometric aspects of their estimation procedure; they applied
Ordered Probit, where they added a random ﬁxed eﬀect error structure
in order to take into account the inter-temporal correlations between
the individual response errors.
Their structural model is the following equation
f∗it =α + γfit−1 + β1 lnyit + β2(lnyit − lnyit−1) + β3 lnyrit
+β4 lnyht + β5(lnyht − lnyht−1) +
K∑
k
δkxkit + ui + eit
The authors postulate that satisfaction at time t depends on ﬁnan-
cial satisfaction in the previous period (t − 1), on present individ-
ual income yit, the change in individual income over the last period,
household income and again the change in household income, and the
average income in the reference group. Moreover, they add a number
of control variables to be looked at in a moment, which are rather
interesting per se. In Table 4.2 the eﬀects are estimated. We are nat-
urally inclined to look at the eﬀect of income ﬁrst. The distinction
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Table 4.2. A ﬁnancial satisfaction equation, Ireland.
Specif. 1 Specif. 2 Specif. 3
Lag log ﬁnancial satisfaction 0.2916∗∗∗ 0.2929∗∗∗ 0.2927∗∗∗
Level of individual Income 0.0061 −0.0061 −0.0010
Change in individual income 0.0319∗∗∗ 0.0287∗∗∗
Individual reference income −0.0311∗∗
Level of household income 0.3541∗∗∗ 0.3830∗∗∗ 0.3828∗∗∗
Change in household income −0.0605∗∗∗ −0.0591∗∗∗
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Intercept 1 1.3900∗∗∗ 1.5063∗∗∗ 1.3950∗∗∗
Intercept 2 2.1233∗∗∗ 2.2393∗∗∗ 2.1280∗∗∗
Intercept 3 2.9491∗∗∗ 3.0647∗∗∗ 2.9535∗∗∗
Intercept 4 3.9136∗∗∗ 4.0290∗∗∗ 3.9179∗∗∗
Intercept 5 4.8631∗∗∗ 4.9786∗∗∗ 4.8676∗∗∗
Log likelihood −51,155 −51,138 −51,135
n 34,354 34,354 34,354
Note: ∗∗∗signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗signiﬁcance at 5%, and ∗signiﬁcance at 10%.
Source: Delaney et al. (2006).
between individual and household income is made because most people
live within a household and then it is mostly household income that
matters, because the partners add the individual incomes together. So
we surmise that household income is the index of material household
welfare. Indeed we see that household income has a solid positive eﬀect,
while individual income has no eﬀect at all. However, the change in
individual income has a short-term eﬀect, as it is identiﬁed by many
people with the evaluation of the outside world. In that respect changes
in individual income are well-perceived by the individual respondent.
Household income changes have a small but signiﬁcant negative sign.
The explanation according to Delaney et al. is that the partner who
is not causing the increase is a bit jealous of his or her partner who
is more successful than himself or herself with respect to money. Then
the authors introduce a variable named reference income, which is con-
structed as the average log-income in the reference group, deﬁned as
individuals in the same age and education bracket.1 We shall have to
talk about this reference mechanism later on in more detail. The idea
is that individuals compare with their reference group members and,
1Actually, the authors do not give an explicit description of how they deﬁned the reference
income concept.
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if the individual’s reference group members are better-oﬀ on average,
as a rule the individual himself feels more miserable. Indeed the sign
of reference income is negative, but the size of the eﬀect is not large.
Finally, the authors expect that present ﬁnancial satisfaction depends
heavily on satisfaction a year before. Changes are translated with some
temporal delay. We see that this eﬀect is rather strong. Actually, we
have here a ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation. What the authors estimate
are short-term eﬀects. If we rewrite the equation as
ft = α + γft−1 + C
where C stands for all the other remaining terms, we get for the sta-
tionary equilibrium value f
ft =α + γft−1 + C
f =
1
1 − γ [α + C]
It follows that the long-term eﬀect of household income on ﬁnancial
satisfaction is not 0.22 but about 0.22/(1 − 0.44) = 0.39. It also follows
for the coeﬃcients δ of the other variables to be considered hereafter
that their long-term counterparts are δ/0.56 = 1.78 ∗ δ
Now we consider the so-called controls in more detail. They are
found in Table 4.3. It is seen that the number of adults in the house-
hold has a strong negative eﬀect on ﬁnancial satisfaction. No wonder,
Table 4.3. Control variables in the ﬁnancial satisfaction equation, Ireland.
Log number of Adults −0.3352∗∗∗ Self-employed 0.0327
Log number of Children (+1) −0.1689∗∗∗ Farmer −0.1844∗∗∗
Age 0.0143∗∗∗ Relative assist 0.0155
Female −0.1145∗∗∗ Farm relative assist −0.3909∗∗∗
Married −0.1944∗∗∗ Training 0.0224
Female∗married 0.1512∗∗∗ Seek ﬁrst job −0.6308∗∗∗
Junior certiﬁcate education 0.1318∗∗∗ Unemployed −0.9046∗∗∗
Leaving certiﬁcate education 0.1545∗∗∗ Unemployed ill −0.3940∗∗∗
Higher level education 0.2338∗∗∗ Ill/disabled −0.3280∗∗∗
Poor health −0.1687∗∗∗ Retired 0.0164
Religiosity 0.0362∗∗∗ Home duties −0.1127∗∗∗
Apprentice −0.1437 In education −0.3921∗∗∗
Temporary scheme −0.2802∗∗∗
Note: ∗∗∗signiﬁcance at 1%, ∗∗signiﬁcance at 5%, and ∗signiﬁcance at 10%.
Source: Delaney et al. (2006).
4.2 Financial Satisfaction 29
because there are more mouths to feed. Similarly the children eﬀect
is negative, but much less sizeable than that of adults. Actually, an
increasing family size has to be countered by more household income
to get the family equally satisﬁed ﬁnancially. It is interesting to get an
idea of what the trade-oﬀ is between family size and income. Let us
assume that the number of adults in the household rises from 2 to 3.
It implies that ∆lognumberAdults = ln(3/2) = 0.41.
It follows from combining Tables 4.2 and 4.3 that house-
hold income has to be increased such that −0.3352 ∗ 0.41 + 0.38 ∗
∆lnhouseholdincome = 0. It follows that log-household income has to
be increased by
∆lnhouseholdincome =
0.3352 ∗ 0.41
0.38
= 0.35
in order to keep ﬁnancial satisfaction constant. Hence, an increase by
50% of the number of adults is equivalent with an additional cost of
about exp(0.35) = 1.42 − 1 = 42%. For inﬁnitesimal changes we get an
adult-equal ﬁnancial satisfaction elasticity of 0.3352/0.38 = 0.88. For
children we ﬁnd in a similar way a child-equal ﬁnancial satisfaction
elasticity of 0.1689/0.38 = 0.44.
Of course, these results are important for formulating a family
allowance policy. We come back to it later in Section 13. The eﬀect
of age seems to be satisfaction increasing. We notice that age is speci-
ﬁed in years. Hence the seemingly small eﬀect of 0.0143 is not that small
at all. In most applications (e.g., see Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell,
2004, 2008a; Plug and Van Praag, 1995), it is found that the relation
between ﬁnancial satisfaction and age is also (log-) parabolic with a
minimum at about 40. Indeed adults with a growing family and grow-
ing aspirations will consider the same amount of money as becoming
less worth when growing older, until about 40. After that age they will
grow more easily satisﬁed. This established fact might be important
for re-evaluating the eﬀect of demotion of older people and/or reducing
the replacement ratios between pensions and salaries. We see that edu-
cation makes people more satisﬁed, which may be caused by the fact
that educated people are dealing with their money more eﬃciently. Poor
health makes individuals less satisﬁed with their money and there is
an even stronger negative eﬀect of being unemployed. Notice that this
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is not caused by the fact per se that unemployed have a lower income,
for income itself is already included as a variable. Farmers are much
less satisﬁed and the same holds to a lesser extent for individuals with
‘home duties’.
4.3 Health Satisfaction
Another application of the satisfaction approach is dealing with health.
We notice that the question is: How dissatisﬁed or satisﬁed are you with
your health? This question has been posed in the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) since 1996. We call the answer to this question
the individual’s Health Satisfaction (H). In the BHPS individuals are
asked to restrict their answers from 1 to 7, where 1 stands for ‘very
dissatisﬁed’ and 7 for ‘very satisﬁed’. It is obvious that this question
is a crucial one for health economics, health being one of the primary
issues in Western societies. With about 10% of the national product
being consumed in terms of health care, health is one of the basic
products in Western society. However, how do we measure the output
of health care? What are the determinants of health? Is it possible to
assign a money value to health improvements? For the establishing of
health policy and the evaluation of policy instruments it is of course
crucial to be able to assess the impact of that policy.
The evaluation is mostly in terms of national life expectations or
some other general measure. In health economics the questions are
frequently more pointed. What determines individual health and how
can we improve individual health?
Health may be evaluated by medical doctors, nurses, etc. and then it
is mostly done in terms of physical and mental capabilities of the indi-
vidual. A rather diﬀerent approach is to take the feelings of the individ-
uals themselves as starting point of the analysis. Then we have to base
ourselves on questions like the satisfaction question described above
and/or more elaborate subjective question modules like the SF-36,
which was ﬁrst made available in a “developmental” form in 1988 and
in “standard” form in 1990 (Stewart et al., 1988; Ware and Sherboune,
1992). They decompose health into components like physical health and
mental health, where each of the eight components is measured on a
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six-scale. For instance, “physical functioning” ranges from ‘Very limited
in performing all physical activities, including bathing or dressing’ to
‘Performs all types of physical activities including the most vigorous
without limitations due to health’. Here the responses are given by the
respondents themselves. This raises two problems. The ﬁrst is that dif-
ferent individuals will have diﬀerent norms. That is, what is a rather
modest health situation for a 30-year-old person will be probably seen
as excellent health for an 80-year-old person. Without taking these
background circumstances into account, the individual answers are not
well-comparable. The second point is the structure of the battery as a
multitude of questions. It poses the problem of how to summarize the
outcomes on the components.
The approach by posing just one question asking for one’s satisfac-
tion with health is more ﬁtting in general surveys, and it gives less inter-
pretation problems for respondents than a whole battery of questions.
It has been shown that the answers to such simple health satisfaction
questions predict future mortality (e.g., Frijters et al., 2011b).
As an example of the approach we present estimation results
that are borrowed from our treatise Happiness Quantiﬁed (Section 9,
Table 9.1). We estimated a health satisfaction equation on a UK sample
(BHPS) where we included speciﬁc health-related determinants, i.e.,
ailments and illnesses, and some general determinants like age, educa-
tion, etc.
Looking at the general determinants of health we see that the age
of the individual, here operationalized as ln(age), is rather important
for health perception. Under ceteris paribus conditions the picture of
health as function of age looks like a parabolic curve with a minimum
at the age of 32. This behavior shows that perception of health dif-
fers fundamentally from the objective health status. There can be no
confusion about the fact that health, measured by means of objective
measures, deteriorates monotonically, when age increases. Nevertheless,
the subjective perception is that individuals become more satisﬁed
with their existing health, when they grow older. Perception is age-
dependent. Clearly, there are many age-related illnesses, and when they
appear with increasing age they have a speciﬁc worsening eﬀect on
health satisfaction. It is also seen that more education does not help.
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Table 4.4. Health satisfaction, workers, UK, 1996–1998, POLS individual random eﬀects.
Estimate t-Ratio
Constant 2.927 2.978
Dummy for 1996 −0.083 −5.388
Dummy for 1997 −0.019 −1.323
Ln(age) −1.307 −2.323
(Ln (age))2 0.189 2.368
Minimum age 32
Ln(family income) −0.040 −1.766
Ln(years education) −0.096 −3.825
Ln(children +1) −0.023 −0.443
Gender (male) 0.008 0.386
Living together −0.003 −0.118
Self-employed 0.056 1.857
Ln(savings) 0.011 2.213
Problems with arms, legs, hands, feet, back, or neck −0.409 −18.921
Diﬃculty in seeing −0.169 −3.269
Diﬃculty in hearing −0.153 −3.534
Skin conditions/allergies −0.172 −6.647
Chest/breathing problems −0.398 −13.544
Heart/blood problems −0.436 −12.204
Problems with stomach/liver/kidneys −0.493 −13.141
Diabetes −0.562 −6.232
Epilepsy −0.517 −3.818
Migraine or frequent headaches −0.249 −8.397
Other health problems −0.603 −14.515
Mean (ln(family income)) −0.011 −0.369
Mean (ln(children +1)) 0.073 1.297
Mean (ln(adults)) 0.009 1.320
Std. dev. of indiv.random eﬀect εn
Individual 0.734
Error standard deviation 0.772
% Variance due to εn 0.474
Number of observations 17,966
Number of individuals 7780
R2:
Within 0.021
Between 0.169
Overall 0.128
Note: There are dummies for non-missing variables, which are not included in the table.
Source: Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008b).
Higher-educated people are less satisﬁed with their health under ceteris
paribus conditions than individuals with less education. Not surpris-
ingly, the occurrence of medical problems has a strong eﬀect on health
perception. All these eﬀects appear to be very signiﬁcant. We also see
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that income, gender, and family composition have no signiﬁcant eﬀects
on the perception of health.
Is it now also possible to attach a monetary value on the health
loss, caused by having, e.g., migraine, just as we assigned a monetary
value to the switch from one type of labor contract to another in the
framework of job satisfaction. However, here we see that this trick is
blocked because the income eﬀect on health satisfaction is very small
and non-signiﬁcant. Hence, we would have to divide by a number near
zero, yielding a very high and uncertain monetary loss due to migraine.
We will come back to this issue later on.
What we can do, however, is to utilize the health satisfaction ques-
tion for a new and intuitively plausible deﬁnition of subjective health
and for a deﬁnition of subjective health losses due to illnesses. After all,
the satisfaction scale may be interpreted as a cardinal scale. We identify
the response 1 on a 1–7-scale with the worst health conceivable and 7
with excellent health conceivable, which on a percentage scale may be
re-scaled to 0% and 100% respectively. Then category 4 translates into
(4/7)∗100 = 57% and so on. Then we may evaluate health diﬀerences
between situations A and B by H(A) − H(B) and relative diﬀerences
by (H(A) − H(B))/H(A). In Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, (2001)
we made such calculations based on the health satisfaction equation
and we found the results in Table 4.5. In Table 4.5 we present the
absolute and relative health losses caused by various diseases, where
we diﬀerentiate for two ages, viz. 30 and 60.
We see that diﬃculties in seeing and hearing are not perceived
as serious health losses, while chest-breathing problems, diabetes, and
depressions cause more serious losses. Aggregating this kind of num-
bers over the total population gives an index for average subjective
health and an idea of the eﬃcacy of various health-improving policies.
Therefore the ﬁrst column in Table 4.5 presents the average health level
of healthy individuals of age 30 and 60 respectively. The value of the
losses has to be set into perspective by comparing them with the health
evaluation of people, not aﬄicted by the mentioned illnesses. The base-
line appears to be about 0.840 for 30 years old and 0.862 for 60 years
old. These values provide numerical losses that might be taken as an
alternative to the QALY (Quality Adjusted Life Years)-approach.
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Table 4.5. Health losses caused by various diseases.
Absolute health Relative health
loss loss
30 60 30 60
Average health for individuals without diseases 0.840 0.862 — —
Problems with arms, legs, hands, feet, back, or neck 0.147 0.137 0.175 0.159
Diﬃculty in seeing 0.061 0.056 0.073 0.065
Diﬃculty in hearing 0.019 0.017 0.023 0.020
Skin conditions/allergies 0.025 0.023 0.030 0.027
Chest/breathing problems 0.100 0.114 0.119 0.132
Heart/blood problems 0.161 0.089 0.192 0.103
Stomach/liver/kidneys 0.219 0.111 0.261 0.129
Diabetes 0.176 0.096 0.210 0.111
Anxiety, depression, or bad nerves 0.203 0.190 0.242 0.220
Alcohol or drug-related problems 0.262 0.247 0.312 0.287
Epilepsy 0.170 0.158 0.202 0.183
Migraine or frequent headaches 0.037 0.033 0.044 0.038
Other health problems 0.234 0.158 0.279 0.183
Source: Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008b).
We have looked now after the eﬀect of some illnesses on the subjec-
tively perceived health condition. However, is this the only life domain
that can be aﬀected by health problems? The answer is no.
Now we consider some other life domains, where we simultaneously
include health variables. The ﬁrst one is again job satisfaction. We
estimated job satisfaction again, but now we added a number of health
variables, which we used also in the health satisfaction equation. The
estimates in Table 4.1 can be compared with those in Table 4.6. Due
to the fact that we added the health variables and also left out a few of
the variables included in the earlier speciﬁcation, we arrive at diﬀerent
estimates. However, the diﬀerences between with respect to the eﬀects
of the variables common to Tables 4.1 and 4.6 are mostly not dramatic.
We have to stay aware of the eﬀect that there is no true speciﬁcation.
Any speciﬁcation is an approximation of the empirical relationship,
which can never be described exactly by a neat mathematical formula.
What is the interesting new feature of the results in Table 4.6? It is
the eﬀects of the diﬀerent illnesses on job satisfaction, which are rather
formidable indeed. All these eﬀects are negative and highly signiﬁcant.
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Table 4.6. Job sat. with health eﬀects included, UK, 1996–1998, POLS
indiv. random eﬀects.
Estimate t-Ratio
Constant 11.362 9.865
Dummy for 1996 −0.019 −1.214
Dummy for 1997 0.009 0.648
Ln(household income) 0.055 1.853
Ln(age) −7.158 −10.700
Ln (age)2 1.052 11.139
Living together 0.167 4.514
Gender (male) −0.121 −4.434
Ln(years education) −0.084 −3.278
Ln(work income) 0.014 1.104
Ln(working hours) 0.007 0.348
Ln(extra hours) 0.042 3.876
Self-employed 0.163 2.293
Ln(desired hours) 0.218 11.093
Work at night −0.125 −2.092
Second earner in the household −0.042 −1.395
Ln(Hours household work) −0.027 −1.788
Ln(children +1) 0.249 1.010
(Ln children +1)2 0.053 0.944
Ln(adults) −0.113 −2.235
Ln[(children +1)∗income] −0.043 −1.422
Ln(children +1)∗living together 0.027 0.523
Problems with arms, legs, hands, feet, back, or neck −0.130 −5.918
Diﬃculty in seeing −0.073 −1.390
Diﬃculty in hearing −0.032 −0.732
Skin conditions/allergies −0.025 −0.934
Chest/breathing problems −0.049 −1.647
Heart/blood problems −0.040 −1.098
Problems with stomach/liver/kidneys −0.102 −2.677
Diabetes 0.070 0.752
Depression −0.341 −9.152
Alcohol or drug-related problems −0.122 −0.673
Epilepsy 0.114 0.840
Migraine or frequent headaches −0.060 −2.006
Other health problems −0.047 −1.126
Mean (ln(household income)) −0.031 −0.849
Mean (ln(children +1)) 0.100 1.736
Mean (ln(adults)) 0.057 0.932
Mean (ln(work income)) 0.000 −0.031
Mean (working hours) 0.004 0.170
Mean (overtime) 0.011 0.629
Mean (desired hours) 0.208 6.289
Mean (household work) 0.043 2.128
(Continued )
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Table 4.6. (Continued )
Estimate t-Ratio
Std. dev. of indiv.random eﬀect εn 0.743 —
Error Standard deviation 0.772 —
% Variance due to εn 0.481 —
Number of observations 17,563 —
Number of individuals 7617 —
R2:
Within 0.019 —
Between 0.089 —
Overall 0.074 —
Note: There are dummies for missing variables, which are not included in
the table.
Source: Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008a,b).
It follows that when we limit the eﬀect of health limitations to their
eﬀect on health satisfaction only, we do not get a correct idea of the
impact of health on other life domains.
Similar eﬀects are found for other life domains like ﬁnancial satis-
faction, leisure satisfaction and satisfaction with social life. We refer for
a detailed account to Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008a).
For an interesting account of housing satisfactions we refer to De Lora
et al. (2010). In that volume we ﬁnd many papers on satisfaction with
housing (in Latin-America) where the determinants are not only char-
acteristics of the individual and of the house but also of the urban envi-
ronment, like the crime rate, distance to education facilities, availability
of public traﬃc, the slope of the road, etc., yielding most fascinating
eﬀects.
5
Cardinal or Ordinal?
In the previous sections the concept of happiness is taken as being ordi-
nal. This was the case when using OLS, Ordered Probit and POLS.
Ordinality means that evaluation of happiness in numerical terms like
‘7’ on a 0–10-scale has no interpretation other than that the respon-
dent feels happier than somebody answering ‘6’ and less happy than
somebody who answers ‘8’ to the same question. Now it may be pru-
dent to position oneself at the agnostic side when responses are cast
in verbal terms like ‘bad’, ‘suﬃcient’, ‘good’ or ‘excellent’. However,
when it comes to numerical evaluation, it may be seen as a too pru-
dent approach, for the respondents themselves most probably interpret
the evaluations in cardinal terms. At least, this is true when individuals
evaluate school grades, consumer goods, services, etc. on a numerical
scale. Then a jump from A to B is thought to be equal to a jump from
B to C. Similarly the change from an evaluation ‘8’ to ‘7’, seems to be
the same as from ‘7’ to ‘6’ (cf. Parducci, 1995; Van Praag, 1991). Then
it seems improbable that respondents would do diﬀerently when evalu-
ating their degree of satisfaction with life. Actually, it may be defended
that the methods OLS, Ordered Probit and POLS are implicitly based
on a cardinal concept as well. These methods are all based on some
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kinds of distance (or squared residual) minimization and those residu-
als themselves imply a cardinalization.
A somewhat older way of asking satisfaction questions has been
invented by Cantril (1965). He supplied the respondent with a ladder
with 10 equidistant rungs, where the top rung stood for the excellent
life and the lowest rung for the worst life possible. The respondent is
asked to position himself on the rung that corresponds the best with
his satisfaction with life. The answers to such a ladder question are
also given on the implicit assumption that the distances between rungs
stand for equal satisfaction diﬀerences.
If we accept this cardinal interpretation, then we may describe the
relation between life satisfaction Un of respondent n and personal char-
acteristics xn by a function between 0 and 1, say, F (xn;β). If the indif-
ference surfaces are linear hyper-planes it may be written as F (β′xn).
Then the speciﬁcation Un = N(β′xn;0,1) lies at hand, where N(·;0,1)
stands for the standard- normal distribution function.1 Now we deﬁne
the values u = N−1(U). In the case of discrete response classes for a
respondent answering 7, we may assume that his true value U that we
cannot exactly observe will lie between 6.5 and 7.5. It follows that his
true value u will lie between the normal quantiles u0.65 and u0.75. Then
two values lie at hand. The ﬁrst is found by assigning to the respondent
the conditional average
ui = E(u|uo.65 < u ≤ u0.75) = n(u0.65) − n(u0.75)
N(u0.75) − N(u0.65)
The second potential candidate is the median value on that interval,
deﬁned by
u
(m)
7 = N
−1(0.7)
For the extremes we have to make a slight modiﬁcation. The left
extreme 0 is assigned to the interval [0, 0.05] and the right extreme 10
to [0.95, 1.0]. The resulting values uin are regressed on the vector xn.
These methods have been called the Cardinal OLS-method (COLS)
and the Cardinal Median- method (CM), respectively in Van Praag
1We notice that apart from the normal and the logistic function rather tractable increasing
functions between 0 and 1 with as range the real axis are not easily found.
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and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008b, Section 2). There it has been shown that
trade-oﬀ estimates are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those estimated
by POLS, while the estimates’ reliabilities, measured by t-values, is of
about the same order as well. The advantage of the two latter methods
is that we can employ the cardinal character of the responses, as we
will do later on.
6
Aggregating Domain Satisfactions to
Life Satisfaction
We have now seen that both domain satisfactions and life satisfaction
can be empirically deﬁned and measured and that their explanation
makes intuitive sense. The question is now: what is the link between
domain satisfactions and life satisfaction? Let us denote life satisfaction,
in accordance with earlier literature, by General Satisfaction (GS ) and
domain satisfactions with domains i = 1, . . . , I by DS 1, . . . ,DS I respec-
tively, then we may assume a relation
GS = GS (DS 1, . . . ,DS I)
which states that GS can be seen as an aggregate of the diﬀerent domain
satisfactions. It may be expected that the function is increasing in all
its arguments, that is, if satisfaction with one of the domains increases,
while the other DS ’ s remain constant, then GS increases as well. The
speciﬁcation
GS = α1DS 1 + · · · + αIDS I + α0 + ε
lies then at hand. This is indeed the speciﬁcation that has been ﬁrst
introduced by Van Praag et al. (2003) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Van
Praag (2002). See also Easterlin and Sawangfa (2009) and Kapteyn
et al. (2010).
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The ﬁrst practical question is the cardinalization to be used.
Extending the POLS-cardinalization of GSn we take for each DS i,n the
POLS-value of the response by respondent n at domain question i. The
other cardinalizations suggested in Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell
(2004, 2008b) give the same qualitative results. However, there is a sec-
ond complicating factor. That is that there may be correlation between
the DS i,n’s and the error term εn. In that case one of the basic require-
ments of OLS-analysis would be violated. This may be the case, e.g., if
an individual is rather optimistic and evaluates everything at the bright
side of life. He evaluates his domains higher than normally expected and
he evaluates his general life situation better than normally expected as
well. The same holds for born pessimists. In that case the disturbances
εi,εGS would be correlated. Indeed it is found (see Van Praag and
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004, 2008b, Section 4) that the error terms of dif-
ferent domain equations are signiﬁcantly positively correlated. Using
the principal component decomposition of the domain error covariance
matrix in order to deﬁne for each respondent his ﬁrst principal compo-
nent contribution Zn, we estimated the equation
GSn = α1DS 1n + · · · + αIDS In + α0 + αZZn + εn
where Zn stands for the common ﬁrst principal component of the
domain errors. The term εn is then the residual after ﬁltering for the
common component Zn.
A typical example of such an estimated equation is presented in
Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Level eﬀects for the British data set.
Workers Non-workers
Job satisfaction 0.112 —
Financial satisfaction 0.064 0.087
Housing satisfaction 0.041 0.057
Health satisfaction 0.102 0.166
Leisure-use satisfaction 0.109 0.237
Leisure-amount satisfaction 0.036 −0.025
Marriage satisfaction 0.071 0.068
Social-life satisfaction 0.116 0.187
Note: Constant intercept and Z-eﬀect are not presented here.
Source: Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008b).
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We see here life satisfaction decomposed as an aggregate of eight
life domains, each with its own eﬀect on life satisfaction. Roughly
speaking for working people job satisfaction and social-life satisfac-
tion are equally important, very closely followed by health satisfaction
and leisure-use satisfaction. The last stands for the evaluation of how
we spend our leisure time. In a second tier we ﬁnd the other four life
domains considered. It is notable that satisfaction with the own mar-
riage scores much lower than the satisfaction with social life. Contrary
to the intuition of still many economists ﬁnancial satisfaction is not
the fundamental determinant of life satisfaction. For non-workers, e.g.,
students, retired, non-working housewives and for unemployed whose
job satisfaction is undeﬁned, the eﬀects are even more pronounced.
It is also interesting that having (too) much leisure time may have a
negative eﬀect for non-workers.
A similar approach may be applied, using diﬀerent cardinalizations,
see, e.g., Kapteyn et al. (2010).
We notice that the domain satisfactions are determined by observ-
able factors x. For instance, if age has a strong eﬀect on job satisfaction
(as we saw from Table 4.1 on job satisfaction) it implies that age has an
eﬀect via job satisfaction on satisfaction with life as a whole. But age
has also an eﬀect via health satisfaction and via most other domains.
Hence, we see that the same variable x, e.g., age, may aﬀect life satis-
faction via diﬀerent channels simultaneously. These partial eﬀects are
of course not observed when we put in the variable age directly as
explanatory variable for life satisfaction. It may even be that the eﬀect
of a variable x on one domain is positive and negative in another, such
that the aggregate eﬀect on life satisfaction is zero. For instance, age
has a negative eﬀect on health satisfaction, while its eﬀect on ﬁnancial
satisfaction is positive after about 40 years of age. Actually, this is a
two-layer model. It is described by the arrow model in Figure 6.1.
The obvious advantages of this split-up are that domains are easier
and better to explain than life as a whole and that it becomes possible
to disentangle the overall eﬀect of a variable. We may identify through
which domain channels the eﬀects are transferred to satisfaction with
life as a whole. On the other hand if such domains are too narrowly
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Fig. 6.1 The link between domain satisfactions and general satisfaction.
deﬁned, e.g., satisfaction with sport, music, smoking, etc. instead of
leisure satisfaction, we run the danger that explanatory variables are
diﬃcult to ﬁnd, that their eﬀects are diﬃcult to identify, and the num-
ber of domains is getting too large in order to explain overall satisfac-
tion meaningfully. Or more plainly speaking, how to specify the model
exactly is an art, and the success can only be measured by looking at
the intuitive plausibility of the estimated outcomes.
A similar approach may be applied on domain satisfactions them-
selves. Take, for instance, job satisfaction. In Van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (Section 4) one may ﬁnd an example on data from the British
Household Panel. The questionnaire contains a question with respect
to ‘job satisfaction as a whole’, but alongside there are satisfaction
questions posed with respect to several aspects of the job.1 Again there
are 7 satisfaction levels speciﬁed. The aspects are: promotion prospects,
total pay, relations with supervisor, job security, opportunity to take
initiative, satisfaction with the work itself and with the number of hours
worked. We now re-estimate the regression for JS, where we specify the
equation as an aggregate of those sub-domain satisfactions as follows:
JS =α1JSPROM + α2JSPAY + α3JSBOSS + α4JSSECUR
+α5JSINIT + α6JSWORK + α7JSHOURS + β.ZJS ··· (6.1)
The estimation results are presented in Table 6.2.
1Some of the sub-domain job-satisfaction questions were not posed after 1997.
44 Aggregating Domain Satisfactions to Life Satisfaction
Table 6.2. Level eﬀects of various job
aspects on job satisfaction.
Satisfaction with promotion 0.148
Satisfaction with pay 0.179
Satisfaction with supervisor 0.171
Satisfaction with job security 0.118
Satisfaction with initiative 0.046
Satisfaction with work itself 0.276
Satisfaction with hours worked 0.143
Source: Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell
(2008a, Table 6.3).
The sub-domain satisfactions themselves may be explained by
objectively measurable variables. Actually, we have here a three-layer
model. Hence, it becomes possible to dissect well-being into domains of
well being that on their turn can be separately analyzed. It is evident
that this model may be extended to multi-layer models.
7
Leyden School
It is frequently thought that happiness economics started in the nineties
of the previous century with the lonesome precursor Easterlin (1974).
However, in the seventies there was already much similar activity avant
la lettre, which later on became known as the Leyden School, named
after the Dutch university where this line of research was started.
It seems appropriate at this point to make a digression on the Ley-
den School, not only for historical reasons but because this work is still
relevant for present day happiness economics.
The beginning is now mostly identiﬁed with Van Praag (1971a).
In that paper Van Praag built on his earlier monograph (1968) where
he argued that a utility function of income U(y) where y stands for
income, called by him then the Individual Welfare Function of Income
(WFI), can be seen as a cardinal concept and that it is likely to be
approximately a lognormal distribution function. In Van Praag (1971a)
the ﬁrst attempt was made to estimate such a utility function on the
basis of survey data, where a kind of subjective satisfaction question
was posed. This was the so-called Income Evaluation Question (IEQ).
We quote a German version.
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Whether you feel an income is good or not so good depends on your
personal circumstances and expectations.
In your case would you call your net household income:
a very low income if it equaled DM (per month)
a low income if it equaled DM (per month)
an insuﬃcient income if it equaled DM (per month)
a suﬃcient income if it equaled DM (per month)
a good income if it equaled DM (per month)
a very good income if it equaled DM (per month)
There are several wordings of this question. First, the number of
levels has varied over time between 4 and 9. When it was ﬁrst posed
in a Belgian survey (Van Praag, 1971a), 9 verbally described levels
were used. In Russian surveys (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van Praag,
2001) 5 levels have been used. Second, in the earliest versions (1971)
the question was formulated in a bit more complex way. In order to
estimate a utility function a log-normal relationship like sketched in
Figure 7.1a and b was assumed. The crucial point is the assumption we
are willing to make about the response behavior. Let the income levels
in the question above be denoted by c1, . . . , c6, then Van Praag assumed
0 1 2 3 4
0.5
1
σ=1
σ=0.5
σ=0
0 1 2 3 4
0.5
1
σ=2.0
σ=0.5
σ=0.1
Fig. 7.1 The Lognormal distribution functions for diﬀerent parameter values. (a) Distribu-
tion functions for µ = 0,0.5,1. (b) Distribution functions for σ = 0.1,0.5.
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that the respondent attempts to answer in such a way that U(c1) =
1/12, . . . ,U(c6) = 11/12. In words, the corresponding utility steps are
the midpoints of the intervals [0,1/6],(1/6,2/6], . . . ,(5/6,1], analogous
to the equal distance assumption implicit in Cantril’s ladder question.
Generalization to more or less levels is obvious. This was called the
‘equal jump’-assumption. The lognormal assumption boils then down
to the hypothesis that
U(c1) = N(lnc1;µ,σ) = 1/12, . . . ,U(c6) = N(lnc6;µ,σ) = 11/12
or
ln(ci) ≈ u(2i−1/12) · σ + µ i = 1, . . . ,6
where uα stands for the α-quantile of the standard normal distribution.
Having six (or in the original paper even nine) responses per individ-
ual n it is possible to estimate two individual parameters µn,σn, for
instance by OLS. Obviously the estimates of the WFI’s parameters are
not very exact as they are derived from six observations per individ-
ual respondent, and the number of observations cannot be increased
very much, since we would have to ask respondents for an ever ﬁner
diﬀerentiation. The basic ‘equal jump’ assumption was tested in Van
Praag (1991) by asking individuals which ﬁgure between 0 and 10 they
associated with the verbal levels in the IEQ. The result was that the
assumption could not be rejected.
The resulting parameters µn and σn appeared to diﬀer between indi-
viduals, giving proof of the fact that individuals have diﬀerent utility
functions of money. The parameter σn could not be explained very well
by individual characteristics, but µn could be explained very well. In
Figure 7.1a and b we sketch the function for diﬀerent values of µ and σ.
We see that U(eµ) = 0.5 and that this median point on the income axis
shifts to the right with increasing µ. The parameter σ is a slope param-
eter, where an increase in σ makes the curve ﬂatter. The parameter σ
is called the welfare sensitivity.
Now we try to ﬁnd the relationship between the personal param-
eter µn and personal characteristics xn of the individual n. That is,
we estimate an equation µn = f(xn). The proto-typical equation for
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explaining µ is
µn = β0 + β1 ln(fsn) + β2 ln(yn) + εn
where fs stands for family size and y for household income. The ﬁrst
reliable estimate of such an equation is found in Van Praag and Kapteyn
(1973) on a Dutch sample of more than 3000 respondents. A typical
estimate of this equation, which is estimated for many countries since
then, is
µn = β0 + 0.1ln(fsn) + 0.6ln(yn) + εn
It follows that the evaluation of an income level y by individual n is
calculated to be
N(ln(y);µn,σn) = N
(
ln(y) − β0 − β1 ln(fsn) − β2 ln(yn)
σn
;0,1
)
The observation that utility functions diﬀer between individuals was
rather new in 1971. Especially the fact that utility functions depended
on the individual’s own income, although intuitively very plausible, was
never made before and empirically estimated. It is now easy to ﬁnd the
evaluation of the respondent’s own income. It equals
N(ln(yn);µn,σn) = N
(
ln(yn) − β0 − β1 ln(fsn) − β2 ln(yn)
σn
;0,1
)
This was called the true income evaluation function. The most interest-
ing parameter is β2, which was called in the 1971 paper the preference
drift parameter. If β2 = 0 the dependency on own income is nil, but if
β2 = 1 the evaluation of own income is N(
−β0−β1 ln(fsn)
σn
;0,1). That is,
if β2 = 1 the evaluation of own income is constant, irrespective of the
level of own income. This reminds very much on modern ‘set-point’-
theory. It is obvious that the larger β2, the smaller the inﬂuence of an
income increase.
It is now tempting to lay the link between the Leyden concepts
and modern happiness economics. In modern happiness questions the
respondent n is asked to assign an evaluation Un between 0 and 10
(or between 1 and 7, etc.) to his life as a whole or for domains like
ﬁnancial satisfaction. We estimate the ﬁnancial satisfaction function
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by the COLS-or CM-method. We notice that also here income yn is
evaluated by a lognormal distribution function, if we keep all other
variables constant.
Now the hypothesis is that the true WFI in Leyden terminology
equals the ﬁnancial satisfaction evaluation in modern terminology.
If that holds then there should hold
N−1(Ujn)≈
ln(yn) − β0 − β1 ln(fsn) − β2 ln(yn)
σn
≈α1 ln(fsn) + α2 ln(yn) + α0
where α1 = −β1/σn,α2 = (1 − β2)/σn, and α0 = −β0/σn. We take here
the more or less random parameter σn equal to its average over the
sample.
As is shown in Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008a,b)
this equality is found indeed.
Summarizing we have at least ﬁve methods to estimate from the
ﬁnancial satisfaction question the corresponding ﬁnancial satisfaction
equations. First, we have the four methods already considered that
yield
u(OP)n =β
(OP)
0 + β
(OP)
1 x1n + · · · + β(OP)m xmn
u(POLS)n =β
(POLS)
0 + β
(POLS)
1 x1n + · · · + β(POLS)m xmn
u(COLS)n =β
(POLS)
0 + β
(COLS)
1 x1n + · · · + β(COLS)m xmn
u(CM )n =β
(CM )
0 + β
(CM )
1 x1n + · · · + β(CM )m xmn
The ﬁrst line presents the traditional Ordered Probit estimates. The
second line presents the POLS estimates. Both estimates are only based
on assigning ordinal signiﬁcance to the responses. The third and fourth
line corresponds to the COLS- and CM-methods. The last two meth-
ods assume a cardinal signiﬁcance of the responses. Due to their car-
dinality we can interpret the values u(COLS),u(POLS) or their normal
transforms as happiness levels. As the four methods are aimed to esti-
mate the same net of indiﬀerence curves, we expect the same trade-oﬀ
ratios, e.g., β(OP)1 /β
(OP)
2 ≈ β(CM )1 /β(CM )2 . This was indeed found in Van
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, Section 2). For dummy variables
and intercepts these approximate equalities do not hold.
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Through the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ) we ﬁnd a ﬁfth esti-
mated equation
u(IEQ)n = α
(IEQ)
0 + α
(IEQ)
1 x1n + · · · + α(IEQ)m xmn
This equation is again estimating the same net of indiﬀerence curves.
We found in Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008b, Section 2)
indeed as expected that β(OP)1 /β
(OP)
2 ≈ α(IEQ)1 /α(IEQ)2 .
The conclusion must be that modern happiness economics and the
older Leyden School are diﬀerent approaches to the same question.
What are the diﬀerences between both?
The two main diﬀerences are:
• The Leyden School approach focused on the estimation of
Individual Welfare Functions of Income (WFI) which refer to
ﬁnancial satisfaction. Modern happiness economics focuses
on satisfaction with life as a whole, although there are
excursions to domain satisfaction, notably to job and health
satisfaction.
• The IEQ of the Leyden School taps information on the
whole utility function, that is, income levels associated with
various levels of satisfaction. The stimulus is the level Ui of
ﬁnancial satisfaction and the response is the corresponding
income level ci. The life satisfaction question asks for only
one response. The stimulus is own income, and the reaction
is the satisfaction with own life as a whole.
On one hand the Leyden method may be seen as more restricted
than the satisfaction question approach as it lends itself hardly for esti-
mation of other than ﬁnancial satisfaction functions, say, job or health.
However, see Van Praag et al. (1988) for some other applications, On
the other hand the Leyden approach may be seen as richer as it delivers
not a point but a whole satisfaction curve per individual respondent.
Nevertheless, there is enough similarity between the two to treat them
simultaneously in the following pages. The main question which has
been posed in the two lines of research is what factors determine indi-
vidual satisfaction levels. This will be worked out in the next pages,
where we tap from the two sources simultaneously.
8
Reference Groups
Individuals derive their norms and values for a large part by comparing
their situation to that of others. Consequently, whether persons are
content with their food situation, their housing situation, their social
situation, their income or their life as a whole, to mention only a few
things, depends to a large extent of the situation in that respect of
others in the social neighborhood or reference group. The best example
is that of income. If everybody in your comparison group earns more
than yourself, then you feel probably discontent with your income and
if you are the richest of the street, you feel well-oﬀ and more satisﬁed.
The ﬁrst implication of the existence of the reference mechanism is
obviously that the evaluation by an individual of his or her situation
is partly relativistic, depending on his social environment. The sec-
ond implication is that the degree of social transparency of the society
aﬀects the feelings of well-being in society.
Within the framework of happiness economics the ﬁrst one who
discovered traits of the reference mechanism was Easterlin (1974). He
compared happiness between diﬀerent countries and he found that
there was not much diﬀerence in average happiness, although the coun-
tries observed were strongly diﬀerent in their average income. Within
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each country it was found that happiness was positively related with
income. The conclusion from this ﬁnding is that income diﬀerences
that are observed matter for well-being, but that diﬀerences that are
not observed do not matter. This ﬁnding has later on been called East-
erlin’s paradox. In recent literature there have been put question marks
to the validity of the paradox, as it was found that average happiness
in some poorer countries was lower than in some richer ones. Examples
of this refutation of Easterlin’s paradox are found in Deaton (2008),
Stevenson and Wolfers (2008a,b), and Sacks et al. (2010). Hence, it is
doubtful whether the paradox in its original form is tenable.
In the Leyden tradition the ﬁrst sign of awareness of the reference
group was found in Van Praag (1971a,b). In Van Praag (1976) we ﬁnd
an estimated equation
µ(c) = 1.92 + 0.13ln[fs(c)] + 0.50ln[y(c)] + 0.30µy(c) (R¯2 = 0.649)
(0.44) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05)
σ2(c) = 0.13 + 0.82σ2y(c) (R¯
2 = 0.024)
(0.02) (0.15) N 2774
where the parameters µ and σ of the individual welfare function are
explained by family size, own net household income and the log-median
and standard deviation of the income distribution of the individual’s
reference group. This result stems from the research paper by Kapteyn
et al. (1978).
We see that there is a strong reference eﬀect of about 0.30. The
authors called this eﬀect the reference drift. As we saw above what
really counts is the term (ln(y) − µ)/σ. Consider the coeﬃcients of
(y(c) − µ(c)) in the equation above. Let us consider the thought exper-
iment that all incomes in the reference group increase by the same
percentage and your own income by the same fraction as well. More-
over, assume that preference and reference drift eﬀects would not add
up to 0.8 as estimated above but to 1. In that case (ln(y) − µ)/σ would
remain constant. In other words, the joint result of preference and ref-
erence drift would be that feelings of welfare remain constant if every-
body’s income rises by the same percentage. The empirical estimate
above shows that in reality the leakage is not 100% but about 80%.
53
Nevertheless, the phenomena as such are very relevant for the eval-
uation of income distribution policies. We refer to Kapteyn and Van
Herwaarden (1980) for the application of this model to a quest for the
optimal income distribution, where they take both the preference and
the reference drift phenomena into account.
Although this approach is intuitively appealing, there is still a nasty
problem. How is the reference group of an individual deﬁned? There
are two ways that can be taken. The ﬁrst way is to deﬁne for each
individual a reference group as consisting of all individuals with the
same age, education, living area, etc. Then the reference income is
deﬁned as the average income or the median income in that group. This
approach is a bit arbitrary in the sense that we deﬁne the reference
group beforehand instead of that we derive the composition of the
reference group from the data. It is the latter way that is chosen in
Kapteyn et al. (1978), which is the basis for the equation above. In a
much more sophisticated way a similar model is estimated on panel
data by Van de Stadt et al. (1985). For an alternative model see Van
Praag (1981), also described in Section 8 of Van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2004). However, most models using reference group eﬀects
depart from the idea of an exogenously deﬁned reference group. We
mention especially Hagenaars (1986).
Actually, the work considered before was focused on ﬁnancial satis-
faction, as it has been based on the Leyden welfare function. In modern
happiness economics the main attention is on satisfaction with life as a
whole. Again we may ask whether the situation of members of my ref-
erence group inﬂuences my subjective evaluation of my own situation.
More generally, we may put the question with respect to each separate
domain of life as well. However, in modern happiness economics the
focus is on life as whole. The reference situation is described only in
terms of income. The reference group is exogenously deﬁned.
It may be conjectured that reference group eﬀects may be found
for all aspects of behavior. The evaluation in terms of satisfaction with
our ﬁnancial situation is just one example of a general sociological
phenomenon. For instance, clothing behavior is determined to a large
extent by imitation of the reference group, which does not have to be
identical with my income reference group.
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Table 8.1. Reference income eﬀects on individual life satisfaction Germany.
Benchmark First speciﬁcation Second speciﬁcation
Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value Estimate t-Value
Family income 0.248 16.67 0.248 16.80 0.100 1.49
yref — — −0.226 −3.47 — —
y–yref when rich — — — — 0.079 1.17
y–yref when poor — — — — −0.189 −2.83
Pseudo-R2 0.080 — 0.080 — 0.080 —
Source: Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005).
Satisfaction with life as a whole is naturally aﬀected as well by the
reference group. Hence, it seems obvious to include average values of the
reference group, especially average income, as an explanatory variable
into the life satisfaction equation. We mention especially the study by
Luttmer (2005) who deﬁnes the reference group as people living in the
geographical neighborhood of the individual. Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005)
considers a German sample, where she deﬁnes the reference groups on
the basis of ﬁve education groups, ﬁve age brackets and two regions. For
each subgroup the average log-income yref is deﬁned. Ferrer found the
following results in Table 8.1, where we only concentrate on the now
relevant eﬀects. For the complete speciﬁcation we refer to the original
paper.
We see from the ﬁrst speciﬁcation that next to income the refer-
ence income has a deﬁnitely negative eﬀect. If individuals are aware
that on average other people in their reference group earn more this
has a negative eﬀect on subjective well-being. This may be split up by
adding for people below and above the reference income the distance
between their own income and their reference income. For the relatively
poor we ﬁnd a strong negative eﬀect, but the relatively rich are only
moderately pleased by the fact that most members of their reference
group earn less. Similar eﬀects are found by Stutzer (2004) and Luttmer
(2005). Daly and Wilson (2011) use suicide data and empirically ﬁnd
that suicide risk depends, controlling for own income and other individ-
ual characteristics, on the income of the reference group. Senik (2004)
studies Russian data and ﬁnds there a positive reference eﬀect. This is
interpreted by Senik (2004) as signaling that an upwards motion in the
reference group is possible.
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All in all we conclude that there is clearly an eﬀect of reference
groups. However, up to now the only reference variable is income, which
may be a very narrow interpretation of the reference group, being
rather one-dimensional. Moreover, the reference group is up to now
exogenously deﬁned according to intuition and not derived from data
analysis.
A more sophisticated model has been recently presented by Van
Praag (2010). However, it is not yet empirically implemented and esti-
mated, and it seems hard to ﬁnd or to create a suitable data set.
Another recent line of research focuses on understanding how indi-
viduals form their reference groups. Up until now all empirical literature
has deﬁned the reference group as exogenous, for example, by looking
at individuals of same education level or age. Nevertheless, recent evi-
dence supports the already existing theoretical claims that reference
groups are endogenously formed. This evidence comes mainly from two
studies based on two diﬀerent question modules introduced into the
2006/2007 wave of the European Social Survey and on the 2008 wave of
the German Socio-Ecoonomic Panel Data. Clark and Senik (2010) used
the questions included in the European Social Survey in which respon-
dents were asked to whom and how much they compared themselves
with others. Clark and Senik’s (2010) paper reports that the inten-
sity of income comparisons decreases with income (i.e., richer individ-
uals compare less), people who compare the most are the least happy,
and that there is a large diversity of groups (for example, colleagues
and family members) to which individuals compare themselves. Mayraz
et al. (2009) report the results from German SOEP-data and as Clark
and Senik (2010) ﬁnd that own happiness is an important determinant
of the intensity of comparisons, i.e., comparisons are endogenous.
9
Memory, Anticipation and Adaptation
It is obvious that life satisfaction is not only based on the life condi-
tions of the moment. Past events play a role in the norms by which
present life conditions or rather life as a whole is evaluated. And we
may even surmise that anticipations on the future play a role as well.
The straightforward way to investigate this idea is to analyze a longitu-
dinal data set, where we introduce into the happiness equation lagged
variables. Let x stand for monthly household income and let happiness
depend on present and past incomes as
ut = β0x1t + β1x1,t−1 + · · · + βkx1,t−k + γ0
If all x′s are equal to x¯, we have
ut = x¯ ·
k∑
i=0
βi + γ0 = x¯ · β˜ + γ0
This is the stationary case and β˜ =
∑k
i=0βi is the stationary eﬀect
of the variable x on happiness. Consider now a permanent change in
income, say from x to x¯ at moment t. Then we have
ut =β0x¯ + β1x + · · · + βkx + γ0
ut+1=β0x¯ + β1x¯ + · · · + βkx + γ0
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Happiness increases from t − 1 to t by β0(x¯ − x). From t − 1 to t + 1
the accumulated change is (β0 + β1)(x¯ − x) and so on. Assuming the
β’s to be positive and decreasing, we see that there is an instanta-
neous change in happiness, but that in the second period there is a fur-
ther increase. The increases continue until the income change is k + 1
months in the past. The ﬁnal value is x¯ · β˜ + γ0.
It is by no means sure that all the eﬀects will be positive. For sim-
plicity let us assume β0 > 0, β1 < 0, β2 = β3 = · · · = 0. In that case
satisfaction in period 1 is less then in period 0 when the income increase
occurred. The accumulated eﬀect after two periods is (β0 − β1)(x¯ − x).
In the case that (β0 − β1) = 0, the adaptation to the new income level
is complete and there is no lasting increase in happiness. All changes in
income would have only a temporary eﬀect. It is obvious that the same
story can be told with respect to other satisfaction determinants like
employment status, marital status, etc. What is the eﬀect over time of
changes, either incidental or permanent, on life satisfaction?
There is a fundamental discussion on this point between happiness
economists and psychologists. Up until this decade, most psychologists
argued that there is a general baseline satisfaction level. Changes in
underlying conditions may cause changes in satisfaction, but over time
individuals will ‘rebounce’ to the baseline that depends on their indi-
vidual character. This was called the ‘set-point ‘theory. More recently,
however, it has become evident that the set-point theory needs at least
some revision, as individuals are not seen to adapt to everything (see
for example, Lucas et al., 2004).
In their classic article on adaptation, Brickman and Campbell
(1971) argued that people are conﬁned to a hedonic treadmill — they
are doomed to experience stable levels of well-being because, over time,
they adapt to even the most extreme positive and negative life circum-
stances. This idea has received considerable empirical support. Most
cross-sectional studies of life satisfaction and long-term emotional lev-
els ﬁnd that objective circumstances account for surprisingly little vari-
ance in reports of subjective well-being (SWB). Even people who have
won large sums of money in lotteries and people who have experi-
enced debilitating injuries appear not to diﬀer strongly from the aver-
age person (Brickman et al., 1978). Thus, although people may react
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strongly to life events, the evidence suggests that they eventually return
to their initial levels of happiness. The hedonic treadmill theory has had
a profound eﬀect on SWB research (for general reviews of the area, see
Argyle, 1987; Diener et al., 1999; Kahneman et al., 1999; Lyubomirsky,
2001; Myers, 1993). In fact, the hedonic treadmill is almost identical
to the preference drift phenomenon from the Leyden school. However,
the perfect set-point assumption is tantamount to a preference drift
rate of 1.0, while Leyden School estimates consistently are in the range
between 0.5 and 0.6.
The theory’s supporting evidence has led some researchers to
conclude that adaptation is quick, complete, and inevitable and that
most of the long-term stable variance in SWB can be accounted for
by personality and genetic predispositions rather than by life circum-
stances (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996). According to this idea, people
have happiness set-points to which they inevitably return following dis-
ruptive life events (Headey and Wearing, 1989; Larsen, 2000; Williams
and Thompson, 1993).
Economists and recently psychologists on the contrary do not auto-
matically accept set-point theory. The proof of the pudding is clearly
in the eating, that is in the empirical evidence that the sum of the
temporary eﬀects
∑k
i=0βi equals zero or not. An authoritative study
is by Clark et al. (2008). Their study generalizes the idea of determi-
nants by looking at the eﬀects of other major life events like marriage,
divorce, widowhood, birth of child and layoﬀ. They do not include
income changes. They generalize in a second way by including not only
past events but also the anticipations on future events. Indeed, indi-
viduals frequently have already an expectation that they will become
divorced, married or lose their job. Diener et al. ﬁnd that ‘they cannot
reject the hypothesis of complete adaptation to marriage, divorce, wid-
owhood, birth of child and layoﬀ. However, there is little evidence of
adaptation to unemployment for men’. All these studies ﬁnd that the
range in time over which non-zero eﬀects can be measured is about four
years in the past and in the future. Frijters et al. (2011a) use quarterly
data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) to study the dynamics of happiness and its interaction with
important life events. The authors argue that the use of quarterly data
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allows them to understand adaptation and expectations in a way that is
not possible with yearly data. They found important evidence in favor
of the existence of adaptation and expectations as well as of selection.
Finally we mention a related approach in the Leyden literature by
Van Praag (1988a), which is based on a cross-section where artiﬁcial
income histories are introduced by using an estimated earnings func-
tion. There a weight distribution over the time axis is deﬁned, includ-
ing weights on the past and on the anticipated future. It is found that
those distributions vary with individual characteristics, notably with
the age of the individual, where young and old individuals are much
more past–oriented than individuals in midlife who are more future-
oriented. Part of it has been summarized in Section 7 in Van Praag
and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008a,b).
10
Climate and Other External Eﬀects
We know that individual happiness is aﬀected by income, health and a
host of other variables, as listed above. Not yet considered are climate
eﬀects. We may conjecture that temperature, hours of sunshine, rain-
fall, etc. will have an eﬀect on happiness. This has indeed been found.
The ﬁrst studies we know of were in the Leyden School tradition by
Van Praag (1988b) on Western European climate diﬀerences, and by
Frijters and Van Praag (1998) on climate diﬀerences on the Soviet-
Russian territory. Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) apply basically the
same method on a selection of countries where they do not consider
individual happiness but national averages of happiness.
Obviously, these diﬀerences are not consciously felt by individuals
in the various countries. The life satisfaction function which is esti-
mated is the experienced utility function, which already accounts for
adaptation to climate. Or said otherwise, the function describes what
an individual in France feels about the French climate and how the
American living in Alaska evaluates the Alaskan climate. If we ask the
French individual to evaluate the Alaskan climate, our estimated func-
tion does not give a correct prediction of this evaluation, as the French
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individual has not adapted himself to the Alaskan climate and is likely
to exaggerate the displeasure of living in the Alaskan climate. Here we
face again the diﬀerence between the decision utility function and the
experienced utility function, which we also encountered when discussing
the preference drift/hedonic treadmill phenomenon.
There is a second point which we have to keep in mind when evaluat-
ing adaptation processes. Consider an individual who would earn yF in
France and yA for the same work in Alaska. Then probably his Alaskan
income would be higher than his French income and the diﬀerence is
probably a compensation for the cold and other climate diﬀerences.
In short, a part of the utility diﬀerences is compensated by income
and price diﬀerences through the market. If at both places satisfaction
would be equal, it is obvious that no additional monetary compensation
is needed to equalize satisfaction. If not, the income diﬀerence needed
to reach satisfaction equality may be interpreted as a residual compen-
sation. It is not the whole cost of the climate diﬀerence between both
places.
A similar exercise has been applied by Van Praag and Baarsma
(2005) for the case of the Amsterdam region to ﬁnd out whether air
plane noise reduces the life satisfaction of inhabitants. Also here the
satisfaction loss caused by noise of airplanes is partly compensated by
lower rents and house prices for houses, lying below the air-lanes.
This method has some advantages compared to the competing
method of hedonic prices as developed by Rosen (1974) and Roback
(1982). The problem with the hedonic price method becomes clear
when we consider the method in detail. In its most simple variant it
is based on estimating how prices of a speciﬁc good, not only housing
or land, but also wine (see, e.g., Nerlove, 1995), depend on external
non-priced variables like temperature, unemployment, availability of
roads, infrastructure, etc. It is assumed that the same variables ﬁgure
in the individual utility function and that individuals are moving to
the optimal place. In that case we may indeed assume that the price
surface is tangent to the indiﬀerence surface and hence that the slope
coeﬃcients of both surfaces are identical. It follows that the relative
subjective trade-oﬀs between variables that determine utility equal the
objectively measurable price trade-oﬀs, estimated from observing the
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price relationship. The snag is in the assumption that consumers are
in equilibrium, which is unveriﬁable, and which is rather dubious in
cases concerning housing. We refer to Van Praag and Baarsma (2005)
for further discussion.
11
Poverty
In social policy, poverty is a key concept. In modern policy it is taken
for granted that one of the essential tasks of the state is to guarantee
a minimum livelihood to those who cannot provide it for themselves.
This minimum level is frequently called the poverty line or minimum
income, also denoted here by ymin. There are two mainstreams to be
distinguished in the poverty literature. One is the traditional one, which
pretends that it is possible to establish a minimum basket of commodi-
ties and services. Then we may calculate the value of that basket at
market value, and, voila`, we have the minimum income level or poverty
line. This is actually still the method which is used in most civilized
countries. This approach is questionable for at least two reasons. First,
how to deﬁne such a minimum basket? This is done on the basis of
calorimetrics or on the basis of a seemingly more sophisticated decision
of a commission of experts and/or politicians. It is obvious that the
so deﬁned poverty line will vary a lot between rich and poor nations.
It is unconsciously relativistic, but this method is also based on arbi-
trariness. For who knows whether individuals, qualifying for the basket,
really qualify themselves as poor, and inversely, whether people quali-
ﬁed as non-poor qualify themselves as non-poor? The relativistic nature
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of poverty is openly recognized by, e.g., the EU and OECD that deﬁne
the poverty line at 60% of the median income in the country. An addi-
tional problem is how to correct for diﬀerent family sizes, etc. Finally,
we have to recognize that poverty might be a multi-dimensional issue
which cannot be repaired by giving only money.
In the subjectivistic literature there are two attempts to deﬁne
poverty. Both have been proposed in the seminal paper by Goedhart
et al. (1977). In that paper there are two poverty lines suggested.
The ﬁrst is based on the Individual Welfare Function approach. Let
Un(y) stand for n’s utility function of income, then we choose a spe-
ciﬁc level, say 0.4 or 0.5 as corresponding to the beginning of the
poverty status. Remember that 0.4 corresponds to a verbal descrip-
tion of a ‘bad income’ on the Income Evaluation Question. Then the
poverty line of n, say ymin,n, is found by solving Un(ymin,n) = 0.4.
Things are becoming complex, as Un(y) depends on personal param-
eters µ and σ, which entails that each individual would have its own
poverty line ln(ymin,n) = u0.4−µnσn . This is politically seen as impossi-
ble. Fortunately, it has been found that µ(yn) ≈ β0 + β1 ln(yn), β1 > 0.
That is, the welfare function shifts with rising income to the right, the
so-called preference drift phenomenon. Consider now the solution of
Un(ymin;µ(ymin)) = 0.4. It is the solution ymin of the log-linear equation
ln(ymin) − β0 − β1 ln(ymin)
σ
= u0.4
where we assume σ constant over n. Now it is evident that there is one
solution ymin and that
Un(yn;µ(yn)) < 0.4 if yn < ymin
Un(yn;µ(yn)) > 0.4 if yn > ymin
It follows that the solution ymin can be considered as the general poverty
line. The obvious advantage of this deﬁnition is that it is grounded
on the individual opinions; if we have a representative sample of the
population, ymin may be considered as the national poverty line at
level 0.4.
There is a second advantage: we saw that in fact µ depends on other
variables as well, for instance, on the family size (fs). It follows that
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the poverty line may be diﬀerentiated with respect to family size fs and
other relevant variables.
A second but related approach, also suggested by Goedhart et al.
(1977), departs form the so-called Minimum INcome Question (MINQ).
Its wording is
What is in your opinion the minimum amount of
income that your family in your circumstances would
need to be able to make ends meet?
That would be $ . . . . . . . . . . . . per month.
It was found in Goedhart et al. (1977) that the answer to this question
which we will call yˆmin,n depends on the same variables as µ accord-
ing to a log linear equation like yˆmin,n ≈∼ α0 + α1 ln(yn), where the
coeﬃcients (except α0) are almost equal to those of the µ-equation.
In a completely similar way the corresponding poverty line is derived.
The corresponding U -level is found to be about 0.55. The advantage
of this procedure is that one does not need posing the rather elaborate
IEQ and accepting the theory and interpretation of a utility function
but can do with the simpler MINQ. It implies that we can derive the
poverty line corresponding to only one utility level and that we do not
know beforehand which utility level it corresponds to. The IEQ leads
to more calibration of the answers than asking just one level. The prod-
uct of the ﬁrst approach is sometimes called the Leyden Poverty Line
(LPL) and the product of the second approach the Subjective Poverty
Line (SPL). Both methods have been frequently applied not only on
western countries, but also on Russia, China and other countries to
calculate subjective poverty ratios and to discover which social types
have great poverty risk. However, the two methods, as far as we know,
have never been accepted for producing the oﬃcial poverty line of a
country up to now. For more on this see Hagenaars (1986), Colosanto
et al. (1984), Van Praag et al. (1980), Hagenaars (1987), and for more
recent applications Bautista (2008), and Gustafsson et al. (2004).
It is obvious that the same method may be applied on life satis-
faction questions. Interpreting the satisfaction function as a cardinal
utility function between 0 and 1, it may be estimated by the COLS- or
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CM-method. Setting the satisfaction function at 0.4 or any other value
we ﬁnd an indiﬀerence surface corresponding with the speciﬁc poverty
level. We may call it the poverty border. Notice that the poverty border
is a multi-dimensional poverty line. It depends on all characteristics on
which life satisfaction depends. We also refer to Van Praag and Ferrer-
i-Carbonell, (2001), Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004, 2008a)
and for a related approach to Pradhan and Ravallion (2000).
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Macro-economic Determinants of Happiness
There are a number of studies that empirically estimate the importance
of other macro-economic variables for individuals’ happiness. If the
objective function of the social planner is a measure of social welfare,
subjective measures of happiness can be used as an important source of
information. Di Tella et al. (2001) estimate a negative and statistically
signiﬁcant correlation between happiness and both unemployment and
inﬂation rate. In their paper they report that the eﬀect of unemploy-
ment is larger: the relation between the two rates ranges between 1 and
1.7, depending on the country and year. Clark et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the
importance of regional unemployment for males’ happiness negatively
depends on their own job prospects. Di Tella et al. (2003) ﬁnd a posi-
tive eﬀect of GDP and unemployment beneﬁts on reported happiness
and a negative eﬀect of unemployment rate. The empirical correlation
between individual reported happiness and GDP per capita has been
frequently investigated. While in the ﬁrst studies authors found a weak
relationship that tended to ﬂatten beyond a threshold (Easterlin, 1974;
Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2008), recent evidence has disputed this ﬁnd-
ing (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008a; Sacks et al., 2010).
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There is also a string of literature that has empirically estimated the
impact of other macro-variables on individuals’ happiness, For example,
there are a few studies looking at the importance of the environment
(pollution). These studies have generally found that the concentration
of pollutants in the region where the individual lives has a negative
impact on self-reported happiness (Frey et al., 2010; Luechinger, 2009).
Metcalfe et al. (2011) studied the impact that 11/09 had on happiness
reports of UK respondents and concluded that respondents who were
interviewed after September 11 reported lower satisfaction scores than
those who were interviewed just before.
13
Inequality
Behind this title two interesting questions are hidden. The ﬁrst one
is whether there is an eﬀect of income inequality, wealth inequality or
inequalities with respect to other features in society on the subjective
feelings of happiness in that society. The second question relates to
the distribution of happiness in a society. For, just like income is dis-
tributed in a society and we can deﬁne inequality of income for that
income distribution, it seems conceivable that we can deﬁne and study
inequality of happiness in a society. We shall consider the two questions
successively.
13.1 Eﬀect of Inequality on Happiness
The ﬁrst question is considered by a.o. Alesina et al. (2004), Graham
and Felton (2006), Smyth and Qian (2008), and Grosfeld and Senik
(2010). Alesina et al. (2004) assume that income inequality (measured
by the Gini index) in the country of the respondent has an eﬀect on
happiness. The idea is that a rising inequality will reduce life satis-
faction. They use a large U.S. database where inequality is diﬀeren-
tiated with respect to the separate states, thus creating diﬀerences in
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observed inequality. Next to it they utilize a comparable European data
set. Their question is whether the state — Gini’s are signiﬁcant deter-
minants of life satisfaction and secondly, whether there is a diﬀerence
between Europe and the U.S. They ﬁnd indeed mostly a negative eﬀect,
but not always.
Graham and Felton (2006) repeat this exercise for a recent Latin-
American data set. As income data are rather unreliable they use
wealth class estimates. They did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant results, which may
be ascribed to the rather rough data and perhaps the speciﬁc deﬁni-
tion of inequality by the Gini-index. A more productive road which
they used was to compare individual wealth with average wealth in the
country. This led to the distinction of a signiﬁcant wealth eﬀect and a
reference eﬀect. Smyth and Quian repeated the previous studies where
they instrumented inequality by the individual’s perception of inequal-
ity as represented by the variable INEQUALITY. This is an ordered
variable derived from the question: “Please evaluate the degree of fair-
ness in the distribution of income” with response classes: 1 = “not
too serious” to 5 = “extremely”. Actually, this is a rather subjective
variable itself. Again they ﬁnd a negative eﬀect.
13.2 An Index of Happiness Inequality
Let us now consider the second connection in which inequality is rel-
evant. Then we look for an index to characterize the inequality of the
distribution of individual happiness in a population. Like any inequality
index such an index is rather arbitrary. The only thing we can say
with certainty is that there is no inequality if everybody enjoys the
same degree of happiness. However, let us assume a happiness distri-
bution U = {U1, . . . ,UN} over the population where the distribution is
unequal, then we have to make ad hoc assumptions. If we would stick
to the ordinal character of happiness statements, then we do not know
what to make from the inequality between three individuals 1, 2 and 3
where U1 = 4,U2 = 7,U3 = 9. It is obvious that individual 2 is happier
than 1 and individual 3 than 2, but what about the two diﬀerences in
happiness? Is the jump between 7 and 4 larger than between 9 and 7.
Or said otherwise, is the inequality in happiness between 4 and 7 greater
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than the inequality in happiness between 7 and 9? This can only be
answered if we assign a cardinal signiﬁcance to the responses. If we do
accept cardinality, the answer can be given. Then it becomes also pos-
sible to deﬁne average happiness as 20/3. In practice many empirical
studies present average happiness ﬁgures as a matter of course. One
of the ﬁrst examples was the famous study by Easterlin (1974), who
compared average happiness per country for 19 countries over a period
of several decades. But if we accept cardinal signiﬁcance for the numer-
ical answers on happiness questions, it becomes also possible to deﬁne
inequality indexes. The ﬁrst idea which comes into mind is to consider
the standard deviation of happiness, that is, σ(U). This is the way,
which is taken in Kalmijn and Veenhoven (2005) and in Ott (2005).
It will be obvious that many other measures, originally used to
measure income inequality, may be used in the present context for
the measurement of happiness inequality. Actually, just like in income
inequality investigations we frequently consider the standard deviation
of log-incomes instead of the standard deviation of incomes, we might
replace the response U by ln(U) and consider the standard deviation
of the distribution of log- happiness.
In this vein Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2008b) considered
the happiness function U(x) as a distribution function and consider the
logarithm of the density function or in economic terms the marginal
utility function. They deﬁne the inequality index as the standard devi-
ation of the logarithm of the marginal utility function. It can be shown
that if utility would depend on income only, this measure coincides
with the standard deviation of log-incomes.
An important paper in the literature of inequality is Stevenson and
Wolfers (2008a) who examine how happiness inequality has evolved
in the US over the last 40 years (1972–2006). These authors report
that although happiness has not increased, inequality in happiness
has decreased very much since the 1970s. This comes from important
changes in the happiness levels of diﬀerent groups in society: while the
black–white gap has decreased, the opposite is true for diﬀerences in
education. Since income inequality has increased, the decrease in hap-
piness inequality reﬂects, according to these authors, the importance
of non-pecuniary things for happiness.
14
Satisfaction and Vignettes
Up to now, we have considered satisfaction as measured by a rather
simple question where life satisfaction had to be evaluated by the
respondent in terms of either a number on a numerical scale or a
verbal evaluation like ‘good’, ‘bad’, or ‘rather happy’, ‘not so happy’.
The same methodology is applicable to domain satisfactions as well,
e.g., job satisfaction or health satisfaction. Rather recently, another
methodology has come up to measure satisfaction and especially
domain satisfactions, which we will now consider shortly. It is the
vignette methodology, also known as conjoint measurement. It is most
easy to explain the method by giving an example of a vignette. We give
an example on job satisfaction, borrowed from Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al.
(2010). In Figure 14.1 we see a description of a hypothetical job and
below the description an invitation to rate this job on a numerical scale.
The crucial diﬀerence between this type of questioning and the sat-
isfaction questions considered thus far is that this vignette question
aims at getting information on the satisfaction evaluation of ﬁctitious
jobs, while the satisfaction question only aims at getting information
on the respondent’s present real job. At ﬁrst sight this looks like a
tremendous extension of the range for satisfaction questions. In the
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Imagine that, for some reason you had to stop with your current job and had to look for a new
one. Imagine that after a short time you get several offers. We will list them on the following 
screen. These listed jobs offers do not differ from your current job except for some points we 
specifically mention.
Can you please evaluate these offers on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst possible
and 10 the best possible offer? And indicate if they are acceptable?”
Wage: 20% more than now per hour 
Type of contract: Permanent with risk of losing the job with no severance pay
Working hours: 20 hours a week  
Working times: Rotating shift system
Training Opportunities: The employer will offer you a 10 workdays training program in the
course of the year. 
Work organization: The job involves working in a varying team
Work Conditions: No one controls your work
Work Speed: The job is fairly demanding, which means that sometimes you may have to work at 
high speed 
Retirement: You can retire at age 55 
Behavioral norms: Same working conditions as in other firms. No loyalty from both sides. 
Shirking and low performance is possible 
How would you rate this offer?
Please evaluate this offer on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the worst possible and 10 the
best possible job. 
Fig. 14.1 Example of a vignette.
present case the respondent becomes not only able to evaluate his own
job, described by a vector xown, but a more-dimensional continuum
of jobs x. This enables us, in theory, to estimate per individual a job
satisfaction function V (x). The same technique is available to estimate
health satisfaction functions on vignettes of diﬀerent health situations,
and so on.
The vignette methodology as such (also known as conjoint analysis)
is extensively used in psychology and marketing (Green and Srinivasan,
1978; Louviere et al., 2000). In economics some of the ﬁrst applications
have been in Van Beek et al. (1997) and Van Ophem et al. (1999).
King et al. (2004) were the ﬁrst to suggest anchoring vignettes as
an additional tool to test whether satisfaction responses are compara-
ble between respondents belonging to diﬀerent cultures. They supplied
diﬀerent people with the same vignette and observed whether they
evaluated it equally or diﬀerently. Indeed, the question is justiﬁed
whether respondents belonging to diﬀerent cultures will evaluate the
same vignette by the same number or the same evaluation. There may
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be two causes for a divergence. First, it may be due to the fact that,
e.g., the evaluation ‘good’ has a diﬀerent emotional connotation, say, in
Italy or in Sweden. It is well-known that Southern-Europeans are more
outspoken in their evaluations than people from Northern Europe. The
second point may be that the situation, described by the vignette, is
diﬀerently evaluated, according to the culture the respondent is liv-
ing in. For instance, the same income level may be felt as rather poor
in the USA and as rather rich in India. If people in diﬀerent cultures
tend to evaluate the same vignette identically, we speak of vignette
equivalence. Kapteyn et al. (2007), Angelini et al. (2008), Bago d’Uva
et al. (2009), and Vooˇkova´ and Hullegie (2010), and a working paper
by Ferrer-i-Carbonell et al. (2010) applied and tested the technique
on its validity. It seems that there is serious doubt on the assumption
of vignette equivalence. It would follow that vignette evaluations are
mostly culture-bound and not usable for international comparisons.
The second question is whether evaluations by means of vignettes
are consistent with answers on satisfaction questions. More precisely, if
somebody’s own situation is pictured by a vignette A, can we expect
that evaluation of the vignette A will be the same as the answer on
the satisfaction question asking for an evaluation of the own situa-
tion. If yes, this outcome is called response consistency. Also here the
outcomes from the same papers are putting response consistency into
doubt. Our conclusion is that the two measurement methods seem to
measure diﬀerent utility functions. The vignette evaluation reminds us
of the decision (or ex ante) utility function, while the real life satis-
faction question reveals the experienced (true) utility function in the
terminology of Kahneman et al. (1997).
Summarizing the vignette technique cannot be considered as a sub-
stitute or an extension of satisfaction questions, but it is a technique
on its own, which can be very useful indeed.
15
The Signiﬁcance of Happiness Economics
for Normative Economics
In the previous sections, we have almost exclusively focused on the
question which factors, personal, psychological or environmental, co-
determine feelings of satisfaction, either with life as a whole or with
speciﬁc domains of life. This is positive economics, or more generally
positive science. The ﬁnal and not unimportant question is now in how
far we can use the acquired knowledge for economic policy, that is,
whether we can derive norms from happiness economics to be applied
in economic policy. Is transferring our results to normative economics
warranted?
As we all know this is a glibbery question. According to Fleurbaey
(2008) most of the results in normative economics, or as it is also called
welfare economics, up to now are negative results, stating that speciﬁc
things were impossible with the famous Arrow impossibility theorem
as the nadir of that branch of economics. Fleurbaey (2008) speaks ‘of
the repeated failure to provide conclusive results and its long-lasting
focus on impossibility theorems. But there has also been a persistent
ambiguity about the status of normative propositions in economics.
The subject matter of economics and its close relation to policy advice
make it virtually impossible to avoid mingling with value judgments’.
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Might it be that happiness economics may be the instrument to ﬁll in
this gap in present normative economics? In a sense yes, and in another
sense no.
When looking in this question we touch again on the question
whether it is admissible to interpret the results in a cardinal way or
only in an ordinal way.
Let us at ﬁrst look from the restrictive standpoint that we are only
observing indiﬀerence curves. That is, we stick to ordinal interpreta-
tions. We start to consider the question by means of a practical exam-
ple: family size and satisfaction. We draw our example from Van Praag
et al. (2010). There we analyzed life satisfaction and ﬁnancial satisfac-
tion for an Israeli survey on the Jewish subpopulation. We reproduce
here in Table 15.1 the present context relevant part of the estimations.
We consider ﬁrst the columns of the second speciﬁcation. We see
here that family size has a strong negative eﬀect on ﬁnancial satisfaction
and a non-signiﬁcant small negative eﬀect on satisfaction with life as
a whole. That the eﬀect of children on the perception of which income
is good is negative is well-known. Having children is costly. As we saw
before, it is even possible to calculate exactly the income compensation
Table 15.1. Life satisfaction and ﬁnancial satisfaction for Jews in Israel, 2006.
Life Satisfaction Financial Satisfaction
Specif. 1 Specif. 2 Specif. 1 Specif. 2
Intercept 11.392∗ 11.004∗ 12.330∗ 12.024∗
(1.404) (1.402) (1.424) (1.421)
Ln(income) 0.159∗ 0.150∗ 0.553∗ 0.545∗
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Ln(age) −6.898∗ −6.654∗ −9.409∗ −9.215∗
(0.769) (0.767) (0.779) (0.777)
Ln(age)2 0.911∗ 0.880∗ 1.282∗ 1.258∗
(0.103) (0.103) (0.105) (0.104)
Ln(family size) −0.034 −0.021 −0.270∗ −0.260∗
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
Ln(family size)∗Religiosity 0.081∗ 0.065∗
(0.022) (0.022)
Religiosity 0.016 0.113∗ 0.033 0.111∗
(0.022) (0.022)
Note: one asterisk stands for signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
Source: Van Praag et al. (2010).
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needed for having one, two, or more children in order that ﬁnancial
satisfaction remains constant; we have to solve the equation
0.545∆ln(y) − 0.260∆ln(fs) = 0
for ∆ln(y), where y stands for gross household income and fs for family
size.
The compensations derived from this equation are:
One child 21%
Two children 39%
Three children 54%
We see that the compensation for a couple to have one child would
be 21% of gross household income in order to compensate for the addi-
tional child cost, 39% for having two children and so on. These percent-
ages are rather high in international comparison. In many states it is
policy to compensate families for having children, either by giving child
allowances, or by giving tax deductions. In this case the exact allowance
needed for having one child would be 21% of gross income. Or to say it
otherwise, a family with three children feels as much ﬁnancial satisfac-
tion as a couple without children that earns a gross household income
of 54% or less. If the aim of child allowances is to neutralize the child
eﬀect, then the child allowance for the ﬁrst child would have to be 21%
of gross income, where the allowance is still subject to taxation. It is
clear that this provides a norm for child allowances. Similar results
have been found for other countries, mostly based on net income and
frequently lower than the Israeli results. However, here we see already
a point of discussion. The norm would provide an absolute allowance
that varies with income, i.e., higher income earners would receive higher
allowances than low income earners. There is a reasonable explanation
for this proportional outcome: people with high incomes spend more on
their children in absolute terms than low income earners. However, are
income-proportional allowances acceptable to citizens or for members
of parliament? In other words, the question is whether the empirical
result, however realistic, is acceptable as a norm? There is no easy way
to solve this problem. As we do not know the true speciﬁcation, we may
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estimate a slightly diﬀerent speciﬁcation as well. We specify the hap-
piness Equation (2.1), say, yn = β1x1n + · · · + βmxmn + β0 + εn diﬀer-
ently. In the speciﬁcation above we have as variables ln(y) and ln(fs).
We may replace those variables by y and fs, respectively, that is, we
drop the logs. In that case we can again estimate the happiness equa-
tion and we get also β-eﬀects, although not the same as above. We may
calculate in that case the compensation amounts and we will ﬁnd a con-
stant amount of money per child, irrespective of the income level and
of the rank order of the child to be compensated. Hence, we see that
the norm to be derived depends critically on the speciﬁcation of the
underlying model. What is the better speciﬁcation depends on the ﬁt of
the equation, but mostly the ﬁt of these equations, however estimated,
is very low, correlation coeﬃcients do not diﬀer very much, and t-values
are large for both speciﬁcations. Here we need intuition and a feeling
for what is ethically acceptable by the majority of the population for
which we tend to set norms.
But there are more points on which we have to decide. In the second
speciﬁcation of the life satisfaction equation we see the estimates of the
eﬀects on life satisfaction. Here the family size eﬀect is only a slight
and non-signiﬁcant −0.021. It follows that family size has practically
no inﬂuence on satisfaction with life as a whole. It implies, as we often
see that the (negative) eﬀect on ﬁnancial satisfaction is neutralized by
(positive) eﬀects on other domain satisfactions resulting in a near-zero
eﬀect on the aggregate life satisfaction. The question which we may
pose then is whether there is reason for neutralization by the state of
family size diﬀerences. The norm based on ﬁnancial satisfaction only
would suggest yes, while the norm based on the much broader concept
of life satisfaction would imply no.
And things can be even made more complex. Revisiting Table 15.1,
we look at the ﬁrst speciﬁcations. Here we add apart from family size
an interaction variable with religiosity. This makes the size of the fam-
ily size eﬀect varying with the degree of religiosity of the individual.
It turns out that highly religious Jews evaluate having children much
more positively than secular Jews. Using the reasoning from above, this
would imply child allowances that would vary with the religiosity of the
receiver. Although the observed result that children count much more
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positively for religious Jews than for secular ones seems very plausi-
ble, the conclusion that the state should giver lower child allowances
to religious than to secular Jews would be hard to swallow. In short,
norms derived from happiness analysis may be unacceptable or at least,
at ﬁrst we have to decide what should be the structure of the norm.
Do we accept that child allowances do depend on the income of the
receiving family, or that child allowances are diﬀerentiated according
to religiosity?
The eﬀect of family size on ﬁnancial satisfaction may also be used
to correct income for diﬀerences in family size. Corrections are indeed
standard practice when evaluating the income distribution of a coun-
try. EUROSTAT applies for instance the OECD-scale where the ﬁrst
adult counts for 1, other adults for 0.7 and children for 0.5. Then family
incomes are rescaled by dividing each income by the number of con-
sumer units for which that family counts. Now the scientiﬁc or empir-
ical arguments for this equivalence scale are practically non-existent.
Then it seems better we employ the information in Table 11 to correct
incomes by the transformation
ln(ycorr) = ln(y) − 0.2600.545 ln(fs)
In that case the income inequality, when measured by the vari-
ance of household size corrected log-incomes becomes var[ln(ycorr)] =
var[ln(y) − (0.260/0.545) ln(fs)]. Clearly the values of the estimated
parameters will vary per country. The advantage of this correction is
that it is based on empirical observations on how family size diﬀerences
are felt instead of on pre-scientiﬁc intuition of experts and politicians.
If we accept that responses on satisfaction questions have a cardinal
signiﬁcance, and the jump from 6 to 7 equals the utility diﬀerence from
7 to 8, at least for respondents belonging to one culture, it becomes
also possible to speak of average national happiness and happiness
inequality. It becomes also possible to construct taxation schedules
that are based on the equalization of subjective tax sacriﬁces, for
instance, by requiring that the tax function t(y) satisﬁes the condi-
tion U(y) − U((1 − t(y) · y) = constant . That is, the satisfaction loss
by taxation is constant, irrespective of the gross income y to begin
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with. The utility function is discretely observed by the responses to the
satisfaction question.
For a very interesting contribution with respect to normative appli-
cations with relevance for legal tort compensations we refer to Oswald
and Powdthavee (2008).
Obviously, as said at the beginning of this essay nobody can objec-
tively prove or disprove that we observe (in a crude form) utility by
posing satisfaction questions. There are even voices that the answers to
satisfaction questions (and Leyden IEQ) may be misleading as respon-
dents are answering strategically. For instance, with respect to ﬁnancial
satisfaction one might answer always worse than the situation really is
to convince the authorities to give more money or to reduce taxes. With
respect to job satisfaction that is frequently the subject of personnel
surveys workers may tend to evaluate their job worse than it really is
in order to get better job conditions. Although this might be the case
for some sophisticated respondents up to now there is no sign in the
literature that this is really a problem in large-scale anonymous sur-
veys. Moreover, if such questionnaires consist of 100 or more questions,
it becomes diﬃcult for respondents to select just a few questions, say
Q. 59 and 80 for strategically answering. Things are of course rather
diﬀerent if such questions are asked in a non-anonymous context, e.g.,
in face to face interviews.
Especially, as the secondary analyses yield very plausible results
that conform to intuition and that are repeatedly found in similar inves-
tigations, we may assume that the satisfaction questions yield valid and
reliable answers which can be used for the kind of analyses as described
before.
16
Concluding Observations, Research and
Applications for the Future
In this essay we have made an attempt to give an introduction to the
ﬁeld of happiness economics. We are acutely aware that in this essay
we have not given to every contributor to the ﬁeld its due credits. Our
reference list is certainly not exhaustive either. However, it seems to
us that readers from this beginning may have got an idea about the
strengths and weaknesses of this approach and can ﬁnd their own way
in the literature, which is growing at an exponential rate.
Up to this moment most of the current research contributions may
be characterized as belonging to positive economics. Within this lit-
erature the main attention lies at understanding life satisfaction or
happiness and thus individuals’ preferences with ‘life as a whole’, with
some diversions into health and job satisfaction. The empirical work
in this area has focused, for example, on studying individuals’ adapta-
tion capacity, their availability to predict future outcomes, and the role
of the reference group. This can contribute to a better understanding
of individuals’ behavior that in turn can be used to predict behavior or
to evaluate public policies. For example, although the economic bene-
ﬁts of hosting large sport events seem to be very small, Kavetsos and
Szymanski (2010) ﬁnd evidence in Europe of a positive (although short
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lived) impact on individual happiness of hosting the European or the
World Football Cup.
We will now make an attempt to pinpoint what will be the most
needed directions for research in the future. Obviously, this is not iden-
tical with predicting what will be the most likely directions of research
in the near future.
As we said before there is a link between the traditional utility
function concept in economics and the satisfaction functions that we
are now able to estimate. If we accept only the ordinal character of
such functions, then the main novelty of the new approach is that
we can estimate indiﬀerence curves between a number of non-ﬁnancial
well-being characteristics and money income (or wealth). For exam-
ple, we can estimate the indiﬀerence curves between income and family
size, health status, environmental characteristics, level of democracy,
and marital quality. From these indiﬀerence curves we may estimate
the trade-oﬀs and shadow prices in money of all those non-monetary
goods. Obviously, at this stage in time all results have to be classiﬁed as
experimental. A lot of the results have to be conﬁrmed on larger data
sets with more variables and more heterogeneous samples. They have
also to be re-established over time. But if these results have proved
their validity to such an extent that they can be accepted as empirical
laws, then the way seems open to use these results for many applica-
tions. We think here that results on domain satisfactions will have more
applicability than results on satisfaction with life-as-a-whole.
We think of the following applications as lying most at hand:
• The construction of family equivalence scales, usable for tax
corrections and social beneﬁts, for divorce cases, and for
establishing child almonies.
• Health equivalence scales, which can be used for health lit-
igations, and the construction of QALY-type evaluations of
therapies and medicines for cost-beneﬁt analysis,
• Substitution of Willingness to Pay studies by more sophis-
ticated survey methods. It is obvious that most conven-
tional WTP-surveys present an open invitation to strategic
response behavior.
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• Results on job satisfaction that can be used for Human
Relations policy in ﬁrms and the construction of pay sched-
ules, the evaluation of non-monetary perks, overtime, service
hours, etc.
• The evaluation of environment and urban living conditions
and the trade-oﬀs between them.
If we are willing to assign cardinal signiﬁcance to our estimated
satisfaction function, a much wider world becomes visible. Cardinal
signiﬁcance, as we deﬁned before, means that we assume that the
(numerical) evaluations of various utility levels may be understood
as equi-distanced on the Cantril ladder. Moreover, such a function is
bounded from below and above.1 Then a satisfaction function may be
described by a distribution function. As income always ﬁgures loga-
rithmically in happiness equations, it lies at hand to take a lognor-
mal distribution function as a tractable two-parameter function or the
CRRA-function as a one-parameter function. The former function may
be seen as a generalization of the latter. In that case the estimated util-
ity functions (domains and life-as-a-whole) may be seen as the classical
cardinal utility functions neo-classical economics had removed from the
stage, and for which nevertheless economic applied theory is so desper-
ately in need.
It stands to reason that this is still a step further than what has
been sketched before. It implies that it is has to be seen as experimental
at the moment. It may be that another functional speciﬁcation yields
a better approximation. For cardinal usage the functional speciﬁcation
is much more important than for ordinal usage.
However, if we accept a speciﬁc speciﬁcation as not too far from
the average truth, then we can make probability weightings to assess
Von Neumann-Morgenstern/Savage utility expectations and accord-
ingly choices under uncertainty and risk can be evaluated. This can
then be used to give empirical content to the corresponding decision
theory (both ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial).
1See also Van Praag (1968) where such assumptions were ﬁrstly made.
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It then becomes also possible to sum utilities over time in order to
assess utility streams over time, giving empirical content to investments
over time, lifetime utility of individuals. Obviously the combination of
aggregation over time and over uncertain events becomes then available
as well. It is obvious that this would also be extremely useful to evaluate
the life-time beneﬁts of therapies and medicines in health-and pharma-
economics.
Finally, we may think then of aggregation of individual utilities over
members of society yielding a social welfare function and social welfare
inequality measures. Such instruments might then be used for con-
structing socio-economic policies. This could become a powerful instru-
ment of analysis for long-term socio-economic policy.
Another ﬁeld of application might be an empirical foundation of
equilibrium and game theory by using estimated cardinal utility func-
tions of the players. However, it may be doubted whether estimation of
utility functions per individual can be so accurate as to predict behavior
of speciﬁc individuals with some measure of preciseness.
To us it is manifest that the happiness approach must be seen as a
gateway to making economics a more realistic science than in the days
when subjective questioning was anathema to orthodox economists (see
Robbins, 1932, and others). On the other hand we have to be modest.
This new empirical branch of economics, or rather of economics and
psychology (Diener and Biswas-Diener, 2009; Kahneman et al., 1999)
is still in its infancy. However, we do not doubt that in the coming
decades it will become a completely accepted instrument of economic
research.
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